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As the last dictatorship in Europe, Belarus is a “problem state” for the United 
States. This thesis analyses U.S. interests in Belarus and assesses the extent of 
interdependence of these interests with Russian interests there. It first establishes a 
theoretical framework for U.S. and Russian national interests and the possibility for 
cooperation between the two countries. It then examines the mutuality of U.S and 
Russian interests in Belarus in the areas of democracy and human rights, drug and human 
trafficking, arms proliferation, oil and gas transit, and Russo-Belarusian trade and 
political integration and the policy options available to each country. Next, other 
elements of cooperation are applied to the situation in Belarus. Finally, the possibilities 
for cooperation are evaluated. 
This thesis demonstrates that the achievement of U.S. interests is significantly 
constrained by Russia’s willingness to cooperate and that the United States can best 
achieve its objectives only through cooperation with Russia. This cooperation should 
center on neither country’s first preference, but a compromise solution involving the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
As the dividing line between Western and Eastern Europe has crept steadily 
toward Moscow, one country represents a last bastion of dictatorial rule and illiberal 
thought. While much of the former Soviet world has plunged over the precipice of 
democratic governance and market economics, Belarus since 1996 has clung desperately 
to an ideal of socialist greatness which has long passed. In cementing his nation into 
nostalgia for the Soviet past, President Alexander Lukashenka has doomed Belarus to 
political stagnation and increasing indigence. His regime has reached the heights of 
infamy for its abuse of human rights, flagrant proliferation of weapons, and notoriously 
porous borders. This has, understandably, generated mounting concern within 
neighboring Europe and, by proxy, the United States. To the east, Lukashenka’s 
unwillingness to reform the flagging Belarusian economy, his blatant dismissal of 
democratic, and even popular, governance, and the embarrassing nature of his personalist 
regime has created numerous problems for Belarus’ patron-state and largest trading 
partner, Russia. It is to these problems, of both the United States and Russia, which this 
paper turns. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how U.S. and Russian interests regarding 
Belarus are interdependent in order to assess the value of cooperation to American 
foreign policy in Eurasia. U.S. policy toward Belarus can either create areas of mutual 
interest with Russia or, if handled poorly, become a source of further tension in the 
relationship. The major questions this paper seeks to address are: 1) What are the United 
States’ and Russia’s respective economic, political, human rights, and security interests in 
Belarus? What is their respective desired “end states” in Belarus? What are the policy 
options available to them to achieve their objectives? 2) To what extent are U.S. interests 
interdependent with Russia’s? What other elements compel the United States and Russian 
to cooperate on Belarus? This thesis finds that the United States requires Russian 
cooperation to achieve its specific objectives in Belarus, while the Russians require U.S. 
cooperation to achieve their broader national objectives. Cooperation is therefore likely 
on Belarus, as this issue is linked to wider interests and issues. This interdependence in 
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objectives is enhanced by the intersection of these objectives with the U.S. and Russia's 
interests regarding the European Union. 
The method of analysis used in this thesis is a comparative study of the United 
States and Russia based on interdependent interests in Belarus.The hypothesis, drawn 
from Axelrod’s and Keohane’s framework for cooperation1, is that if there is a significant 
level of mutual interest between the countries, then the presence of the long shadow of 
the future and other actors, namely Europe, could enable the possibility for cooperation. 
This analysis first establishes a theoretical framework for U.S. and Russian 
national interests and the possibility for cooperation between the countries. Then it 
establishes a mutuality of interest through a discussion of the major issues of concern in 
Belarus and the policy options available to each country. Next, other elements of 
cooperation are discussed as they apply to the situation in Belarus. Finally, the 
possibilities for cooperation are evaluated. 
CHAPTER II 
Chapter II lays out the theoretical framework and methodology based on the 
neoliberal institutional model of cooperation analysis originally proposed by Axelrod and 
Keohane. This chapter also examines other theoretical approaches to the subject and 
shows why the neoliberal institutional model is most apt. This chapter also discusses the 
theoretical foundation for the United States’ and Russia’s general national interest, in 
order to apply these interests to Belarus. Based on the neoliberal institutional framework 
for cooperation, this study examines what interests the United States and Russia have in 
common with regard to Belarus and whether each side is compelled to cooperate.  
CHAPTER III 
The third chapter explores the first part of the mutuality of the United States’ and 
Russia’s economic, political, human rights, and security interest in Belarus. For the 
United States, security and human rights are the highest priority. Specifically, this means 
that the United States has an interest in 1) preventing the proliferation of arms to potential 
threats, 2) stopping the illegal trafficking of drugs and humans, and 3) supporting the 
democratic freedom of the Belarusian people.  A question arising from this framework 
 
1 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1, October 1985, pp. 226-254. 
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addressed in this chapter is whether the United States can attain its interests in Belarus 
without the cooperation of Russia. Belarus has to this point ignored U.S. diplomatic and  
economic sanctions and appears content to remain isolated from the West. Finally, U.S. 
policy options toward Belarus and show how these compel the United States toward 
cooperation with Russia. 
CHAPTER IV 
The fourth chapter is an assessment of the most important interests for Russia in 
Belarus. For Russia, economic and political concerns are the most salient. This means: 1) 
retaining stability in the energy transit corridor through Belarus to Europe, 2) maximizing 
the potential of the Russo-Belarusian trade relationship through the reform and 
privatization of the backward Belarusian economy and the countering of trade diverting 
activity, and 3)continued integration through regional structures toward the end of 
unification. This thesis then evaluates Russia’s policy options to Belarus in terms of 
achieving their greater national interest. 
CHAPTER V 
Having outlined each side’s interests in the previous chapters, Chapter V 
examines what factors could compel Russia and the United States toward cooperation. 
These interests are linked together to show the commonality of interests between the 
United States and Russia when it comes to Belarus.  
Chapter V also examines the second element of the Axlerod – Keohane model 
whether Russia is dependent on the United States for the attainment of its broader 
national interests. It is in this capacity that the long shadow of the future comes into play. 
In its ongoing negotiations to accede to the World Trade Organization, Russia is reliant 
on a cooperative United States. Russia’s desire to regain “great power” status conditions 
the extent to which it is willing to be seen as uncooperative. Additionally, the United 
States and Russia have a strategic partnership in the war on terror which policymakers are 
unlikely to jeopardize by defecting on a relatively peripheral issue such as Belarus. 
Interdependence in the U.S.-Russian relationship means that the United States requires 




American cooperation to achieve its general interests and place in the world.  By linking 
Belarusian issues to wider and more important agreements, cooperation can be made 
more likely. 
Finally, the third dimension of cooperation cited by Keohane and Axelrod, the 
number of players in the game, is discussed. This is highly applicable to the situation in 
Belarus as there are a number of different actors involved. The United States and Russia, 
one the leading global power and the other a dominant regional power, are obviously 
relevant to the analysis. Less obvious but equally influential is Europe and specifically 
Poland. Placing Russian and American interests within this broader context of Europe 











                                                
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY  
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The interaction between the United States and Russia over the former Soviet state 
of Belarus is a complex relationship and can be viewed through a number of lenses. A 
neorealist framework of analysis might perceive this relationship as one of certain 
conflict by emphasizing relative versus absolute gains. A constructivist perspective might 
look at the ideas which inform U.S. and Russian political outlooks and determinations of 
interests. Finally, the neoliberal institutional perspective is one which sees possibilities 
for cooperation based on a number of clear criteria. 
1. Neorealism 
A realist view of U.S. and Russian strategic interaction in Belarus would likely be 
a pessimistic one. The neorealist school of international relations views dealings between 
states as set within a self-help system in which states seek to maximize their security 
through power-balancing. According to Kenneth Waltz, “Among states the state of nature 
is a state of war.”2 For Waltz, that does not mean that states are power-maximizers, but 
security-maximizers. Waltz notes that “power is a means not an end” and that “increased 
power may or may not serve that end.”3 Because neorealism is based on the concept of 
relative gains versus absolute gains, states are “compelled to ask not ‘Will both of us 
gain?’ but ‘Who will gain more’”.4 This concern with relative gains makes cooperation 
difficult and gives rise to the phenomenon of international relations known as the 
“security dilemma”. The security dilemma is the unfortunate reality of international 
relations wherein “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security 
decrease the security of others.”5 When states feel insecure and attempt to increase their  
 
 
2 Kenneth Waltz, “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power,” chapter 5 in Keohane, Neorealism and its 
Critics {reprinted from Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chapter 6}. pp. 98.  
3 Waltz, 127. 
4 Ibid, 101. 
5 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 
1978, pp. 169.  
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security through arming, this threatens other states who reciprocally increase their arms. 
This situation often leaves one or both of the states in less secure positions than when 
they began.  
For a neorealist, this is loosely analogous to the situation the U.S. and Russia find 
themselves in over Belarus. Although not technically dealing with arms, the security 
dilemma could operate on the political level. Realists expect states to compete over 
spheres of influence. Under this scenario, attempts by one side to increase influence in 
Belarus could be seen as a direct threat to the other state. In Russia, Western involvement 
in its “near abroad” could be viewed as an attempt to detract from Russian power by 
undermining one of its closest allies. According to realists, U.S. support for regime 
change in Belarus should be seen as an affront to Russia’s regional predominance. In the 
same way, Western realists tend to perceive Russian attempts to tighten integration with 
its neighbors as part of a plot to resurrect the Soviet Union. The United States feels that 
the key to its long term security extends beyond balancing power to the spread of 
democracy and free markets, as this increases U.S. political and economic influence in 
the region. A direct implication of this strategic perspective is that an open Belarus would 
give the US more leverage over Belarusian foreign and economic policy. Therefore 
Western support for regime change against Lukashenka is justified. Though Russia would 
benefit as well from a more liberalized Belarus as a trading partner and ally, it is likely to 
resist “American” liberalization as realists would interpret this as attempt to expand the 
U.S.’s sphere of influence. 
The difficulty of applying a neorealist theoretically framework to Russia’s 
relationship with the United States is that is does not always bear out in reality. History 
has shown that Russia has cooperated with the United States, or at least acquiesced, when 
the neorealist security dilemma would have predicted conflict. Russian acquiescence to 
NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe, American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty, and the use of Central Asian bases by U.S. armed forces gives testament 
to this fact. These challenges to Russian regional authority should have, in neorealist 
thinking, placed the United States and Russia into an antagonistic stance toward one 
another. Yet, at a time when the United States is having difficulty cooperating even with 
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its closest allies, relations between the U.S. and Russia are more often characterized by 
cooperation than conflict. The U.S. and Russia are strategic allies in the war on terror and 
Presidents Bush and Putin continue to hold frequent cordial summits. There are, it seems, 
elements to Russian calculation of interest beyond the narrowly defined security interests 
of neorealism. The United States actions, as well, can not be accurately described as 
simply seeking to expand its sphere of influence, but rather seems to reflect a more 
Kantian understanding of peace and stability. A strictly neorealist framework of power-
balancing does not do justice to the reality of the U.S. - Russian relationship and a more 
encompassing strategic framework is required. 
2. Constructivism 
Another possible theoretical school through which the Belarus dilemma can be 
analyzed is constructivism. Constructivism differs from both neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism in that it does not subscribe to the underlying assumption that states are 
rational actors with uniform preferences. Whereas the other two schools hold that the 
international structure is the causative agent for state behavior, constructivists look to 
interests and identities as the guiding forces in international affairs. According to Ruggie, 
“constructivism concerns the issue of human consciousness in international life,” and 
holds that the building blocks of international relations are ideational and normative as 
well as material and instrumental.6 Constructivists emphasize process versus structure 
and do not employ the “self-interested state as the starting point for theory.”7 Ruggie 
characterizes constructivism as operating before neorealism and liberalism kick in by 
providing answers to the derivation of state interest which the other schools simply 
assume as constant.8
 Applied to an analysis of the U.S. – Russian relationship in Belarus, a 
constructivist approach might examine the theoretical ideas and ideological pre-
conceptions toward foreign policy that inform the Bush and Putin administrations. In 
 
6 John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 879 
7 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-392. 
8 Ruggie, 863, 867. 
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constructivism, it is not the interests of the United States and Russia which are important, 
but the ideas, motives, and political outlooks behind those interests. Constructivists might 
argue that Russians are guided by a realist ideology in framing their national interests, 
while Americans are guided by Kantian liberalism. With realism guiding them, Russians 
would interpret any decrease in Belarusian dependence as a loss to their main competitor, 
the United States. Americans would see Russian illiberalism as producing irreconcilable 
foreign policy interests. Regarding Belarus, a constructivist would likely view any 
temporary convergence of interest arising from mutual dislike of Lukashenka as 
insufficient to bridge the ideological divide between Russian realism and American 
liberalism. The constructivist approach is beneficial for understanding the reasons behind 
the United States’ and Russia’s interests in Belarus, but fails by underestimating the 
potential for cooperation. As with neorealism, constructivist expectations of U.S.-Russian 
conflict based on differences in political outlook do not bear out fully in reality. The old 
adage, “politics makes strange bed-fellows” holds true with regard to the relationship 
between the United States and Russia. Regardless of the ideological bent of his 
counterpart, both Presidents Bush and Putin have followed where his country’s interests 
have led. In order to understand the U.S.-Russian relationship in Belarus a theoretical 
framework is needed which takes the power of mutual interest into account.  
3. Neoliberal Institutionalism 
A better way of examining American and Russian interaction in Belarus can be 
found in the ideas of neoliberal institutionalism. Like neorealism, the neoliberal 
institutional school derives from a rationalist view of states, which holds egoistic states as 
the significant units of analysis in international relations. Neoliberal institutionalism 
diverges from neorealism in its focus on the possibilities for cooperation. Axelrod and 
Keohane assert that the anarchy of the international system does not necessarily doom 
states to conflict. They write that the “myopic pursuit of self-interest can be disastrous. 
Yet both sides can benefit from cooperation.” 9 In their article “Achieving Cooperation 
under Anarchy,” the authors outline three dimensions that condition the ability of states 
to cooperate. These dimensions, 1) mutuality of interest, 2) the long shadow of the future, 
 
9Axelrod and Keohane, 226-254. 
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and 3) the number of actors involved, can also be applied to the U.S. - Russian 
relationship regarding Belarus. First, both states share a broad mutual interest in making 
Belarus a stable, productive member of the world economic and political community. The 
United States and Russia simply differ on how such a change should come about. The 
body of this paper will further explore what interests Russia and the United States hold in 
common.  
The second dimension of cooperation is the long, shadow of the future. Unlike 
one-time iterations of laboratory games, real world state interaction happens with the 
expectation of future dealings in mind. States that are competing now can expect to 
interact again in the future. This expectation conditions behavior and increases states’ 
willingness to accept short term loss in exchange for long term gain. This is no truer than 
in the U.S.-Russian relationship. As mentioned before Russia has on several occasions 
assented to U.S. intrusion on its interests. Neoliberal institutionalists would attribute this, 
at least in part, to Russia’s expectation of future interaction with the United States. The 
United States is as important to Russia in its bid to join the WTO as Russia is the U.S. 
“war on terrorism”.  
The third dimension of cooperation, the number of actors and the structure of their 
interaction, also applies to the discussion of U.S. - Russian relations in Belarus. Although 
I have set up the problem as simply one state versus another, the reality is not nearly so 
parsimonious. European nations also have interests in Belarus, but are not uniform in 
their feelings toward Lukashenka. Belarus is important to the United States because it 
borders Europe; Europe is important to Russia as a large trading partner and international 
power broker. European expectations influence both the U.S. and Russia in their 
respective policies toward Belarus. Focusing on the three criteria of neoliberal 
institutional theory espoused by Axelrod and Keohane clearly outlines the path by which 
cooperation might be achieved. This provides sufficient reason to base the analytical 






                                                
B. INTEREST FORMULATION  
1. General U.S. National Interest 
In order to formulate a nation’s foreign policy, it is necessary to determine what 
this nation’s grand strategic interests are. In the United States, this determination is 
informed by two competing theoretical frameworks. Deriving from international relations 
theory, these two schools of thought are realism and liberalism. While classical realism 
diverges from structural or neo-realism in the reasons why states act the way they do, all 
realist thinkers view international relations through the framework of state sovereignty 
and power. Liberalism, on the other hand, derives from the same rational basis of state 
interaction but imbues this interaction with normative judgments based on Wilsonian  
principles of political freedom and economic liberalization. Liberalism focuses on the 
necessity of international law and the importance of spreading free markets and 
democratic political values.10  
United States foreign policy is sometimes seen as hypocritical as it is pulled 
between these often opposing viewpoints. While American politicians loudly proclaim 
liberal values, U.S. actions can often be better explained through a realist framework. 
Thus, it seems that America earnestly desires the idealist goals espoused by liberalism, 
but is forced to revert to realist thinking on issues of national survival. It is because of 
this historical tendency that Robert Art’s national interest paradigm is particularly 
useful.11 As American policymakers and implementers are neither uniform nor static in 
thought nor always consistent in action, determining what they are likely to view as an 
American national interest is difficult. As an underpinning for the grand strategy of 
selective engagement, Art’s bifurcated approach seems to lend itself the best to the 
United States’ historical and current policy inclinations. This approach divides U.S. 
interests into two categories: those deriving from the international relations theory of 
neorealism and those based on liberal thought. 
 
10 Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, International Relations: The Changing Contours of Power. 
(Boston: Addison-Wesley Longman, 2000), 15-16.  
11 Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” in America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, ed. Michael 
E. Brown, et al. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 145-149.  
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Drawing from Art’s interest formulation, the United States’ realist-based national 
interests can be divided into: 1) Defense of the American homeland, 2) Preservation of 
Eurasian great power peace and stability, and 3) Division of world energy reserves. Art 
defines homeland security as the “prevention of attack, invasion, conquest, or destruction 
of a state’s territory.”12  The specific policy priorities of counterterrorism and arms 
counter-proliferation can be placed under the auspices of this broad label. Maintaining 
Eurasian peace and stability entails preventing war or instability between the great 
powers, as trans-Atlantic alliances would necessarily involve the United States in any 
such conflict. Additionally, Eurasian stability is critical to U.S. economic interests as 
many of the United States’ largest trade partners reside in either Europe or Asia. Finally, 
the United States’ third realist interest lies in ensuring access to a secure supply of energy 
resources at stable prices. Energy resources fuel the U.S. economy and allow Americans 
to enjoy such a high standard of living. While threats to this interest are most often 
manifested in Middle Eastern disputes over oil, it applies as well to Eurasia. Russia and 
Central Asia have become indispensable suppliers of both oil and natural gas to Europe 
and a severe disruption in this supply would have economic consequences for the United 
States as well. American territoriality security, Eurasian peace, and the global division of 
energy resources are inherently intertwined and mutually supporting as they ensure the 
continuance of the United States’ role in the world. Arising from a neorealist philosophy 
these vital interests define what America must do. U.S. liberal interests inform 
policymakers what the United States should do. Failure to attain the former implies that 
the United States may cease to exist in the near term; failure to support the latter corrodes 
the nation’s philosophical underpinning and endangers America’s long term place in the 
world.  
There are an untold number of issues which U.S. policymakers would like to 
address. Unfortunately, they are constrained by limited capital, both financial and 
political. Often realists would prefer to confine these policy choices to the realm of 
imminent security threats and power enhancement, but to do so would neglect the long-
term interests of the United States. Because the spread of democracy and free-market 
                                                 
12Art, 147.  
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capitalism is inextricably bound up in American world supremacy, liberal objectives are 
as important as neorealist ones. Over the course of a century, tactical realist priorities 
often become irrelevant, but investing in the broader goals of 1) opening international 
markets and 2) spreading democracy and protecting human rights will continue to pay 
dividends to the United States in the future.13 International open markets are desirable for 
the United States not only because they enrich the U.S. through static and dynamic gains, 
but because they make other countries richer. Art theorizes that the United States desires 
for other countries to be wealthy because this makes them both more likely to consume 
America goods and less likely begin wars. A humorous illustration of this is found in 
what Thomas Friedman calls the Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention. In this 
theory “when a country reached the level of economic development where it had a middle 
class big enough to support a McDonald's network, it became a McDonald's country. And 
people in McDonald's countries didn't like to fight wars anymore; they preferred to wait 
in line for burgers.”14  Liberal theory posits that increasing affluence is correlated with the 
beginnings of democracy, as well. The spread of democracy and political freedom and 
the safeguarding of human rights are desirable to the United States for many reasons. One 
rationale is that democracy and freedom are the bedrock moral values upon which 
America claims to be founded. Another motivation for spreading democracy is that 
democratic institutions and popular participation tend to make other states more pacific, 
less likely to murder their citizens, and better trading partners. While liberal based 
national interests lack the immediacy and concreteness of neorealist goals, they are 
nonetheless vital to the moral and practical survival of the United States.  
Pulled from opposite sides by different sets of values, it is often unclear what 
areas of interest are most vital to the United States. By continually subverting liberal, 
value-driven interests to power-based realist interests, U.S. policymakers risk 
undermining American moral legitimacy. Yet, sacrificing American security and status 
for pie-in-the-sky ideals could endanger the nation’s survival. U.S. interests can be seen 
as a delicate balance between the “hard” security objectives of defending America’s and 
 
13Art,  145. 
14 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree. (London: Harper Collins, 2000), 248-249. 
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its allies’ territory and way of life and the “soft power” concerns of promoting free 
markets, democracy, and human rights.  
2. General Russian National Interest 
The aforementioned balance between neorealism and liberalism is not nearly so 
delicate in Russian politics. Realist thinking dominates in Moscow, while liberal thinkers 
are largely relegated to a peripheral role. Often associated with the Yeltsin period of 
instability and corruption, liberals in Russia find it difficult to generate mass appeal. 
Russian political expert Alexei Arbatov remarks that, “In the 1990’s the rightwing 
liberals, who held ranking posts in the Russian power structure, if not directly ruled it, 
failed to carry through the reforms. This left people disillusioned.”15 Additionally, there is 
a significant ideological split within Russian liberalism between the West-centric 
Modernizers and Radical Institutionalists and the more nationally minded Moderate 
Institutionalists and National Democrats.16 In general, liberal international relations 
theory is not taken as seriously as neorealism as a legitimate ideological basis for foreign 
policy. President Putin and his advisors are solidly realistic, although there certainly are 
differences in degree and practical implementation. Russian realists are united in the 
belief that “Russian identity should be associated with the historical tradition of great 
power status.”17 Putin realizes the importance of international institutions and wants to be 
seen as a viable partner to the West. Russian cooperation with the West, though, is not an 
attempt to bring about Kant’s perpetual peace; it is simply seen as helpful in rebuilding 
Russia as a great power. Thus, Russia’s international relations stance can be seen as the 
occasional use of liberal means towards a strictly realist end. 
Based on this framework of realist goals and liberal means, Russia is understood 
to have a number of broad national interests. Allen Lynch provides a succinct account of 
these vital interests which include:  
1) preservation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation itself; 
 
15 Alexei Arbatov, “Color Revolutions and Greater Europe,” RIA Novosti. 31 May 2005. from 
Johnson’s Russia List #24 - JRL 9164 http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9164-24.cfm  (21 July 2005). 
16  Pavel A. Tsygankov and Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Dilemmas and Promises of Russian Liberalism,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 37 (2004) 53-70 
17 Tatyana A. Shakleyina and Aleksei D. Bogaturov, “The Russian Realist School of International 
Relations,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 37 (2004) 49. 
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2) assuring the geopolitical primacy of Russia in the region described by the 
borders of the former USSR; 
3) assuring the security and stability of Russian nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction; 
4) promoting Russian economic development; 
5) maintaining Russia’s status as a great international power; 
6) asserting the maximum feasible peerage with the G-7 group of advanced 
industrial democracies.18 
 
Andrew Kuchins, Viacheslav Nikonov, and Dmitri Trenin seem to agree with Lynch’s 
assessment of Russian interests. In their analysis, they divide Russian interests into three 
categories of: 1) Global Order and Integration, 2) Global, Regional, and Territorial 
Security, and 3) Economic Growth and Development. Within these broader categories, 
Kuchins, et al. cite specific policy priorities that would also fall into Lynch’s categories.19  
The specific Russian interests they cite are as follows: 
Global Order and Integration: 
• To be viewed as a great power – economically viable, technologically advanced, 
socially attractive and politically influential; 
• To secure Russia’s position in the group of the industrial democracies (G-8) as 
well as to raise Moscow’s influence in leading global and regional decision-
making processes; 
• To achieve maximal integration on acceptable terms in international multilateral 
institutions tasked with managing world affairs. 
Global, Regional and Territorial Security: 
• To maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state; 
• To defeat terrorist and separatist groups and shut off their sources of support; 
• To promote peace and stability on its borders and prevent armed conflict in 
neighboring territories;  
                                                 
18 Allen C. Lynch, “The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s,” Russia After Communism. 
Ed. Rick Fawn and Stephen White, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 162. 
19 Andrew Kuchins, Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Dmitri Trenin. “U.S.-Russian Relations: The Case for 
an Upgrade,” Carnegie Center for International Peace. Moscow 2005 www.carnegie.ru (13 Jan 2005), 4-5. 
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• To prevent the emergence of non-friendly regimes along its border as well as to 
strengthen military structures and coalitions friendly to Russian interests;  
• To prevent illegal migration, drug trafficking and illegal trade in arms;  
• To work cooperatively to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
Economic Growth and Development: 
• To facilitate an external environment that promotes economic growth and 
development at home;  
• To quickly conclude negotiations for Russia’s WTO entry;  
• To advance its business and economic interests in foreign markets and to attract 
investment into the Russian economy;  
• To create beneficial terms for extraction and export of natural resources, energy in 
particular but not at the cost of mortgaging the future of the Russian people;  
• To strengthen economic integration among its CIS neighbors and create a regional 
free-trade zone;  
• To diversify its economy away from the current high dependence on natural 
resource exports. 
 
These vital interests break down along ideological lines. Lynch’s vital interests of 
territorial integrity and WMD control, termed “Global, regional, and territorial security” 
by Kuchins, et al., though deriving from realism are more pragmatic than ideological as 
they are necessary for the survival of Russia as a state. Three of the remaining interests 
outlined by Lynch seem to be means to an end, “maintaining Russia’s status as a great 
international power.” This is paralleled in Kuchins et al’s category of “Global Order and 
Integration.” Of these interests, international peerage derives from more from a liberal 
mindset, “assuring the geopolitical primacy of Russia in the region described by the 
borders of the former USSR” is strictly realist, and the third, economic development, is 
important in both frameworks. Thus, Russia’s pursuit of realist great power status is a 
bifurcated approach departing from both liberalism and neorealism. On the whole, 
though, Russian foreign policy can be characterized as largely realism-based, with 
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international minded liberal goals only pursued in order to secure the narrower ambition 



























III. U.S. INTERESTS IN BELARUS 
Although the United States has numerous peripheral interests in Belarus, many of 
which are shared to a greater or less extent with Russia, it is human rights and non-
traditional security issues which dominate American political discourse concerning 
Belarus. This chapter suggests that U.S. interests in Belarus stem less from realist 
concerns regarding Belarus’ place in the European distribution of power, and more from 
the United States’ liberal values, indeed from a Kantian view of the relationship between 
democracy and peace and stability in Eurasia.  
One human rights issues in which the United States takes an active interest is the 
lack of political freedom and democratic processes in the Belarusian government. This 
interest stems from the broader American Kantian interest of democracy promotion as a 
means to world peace. Another area of interest to the United States is the fluidity of the 
Belarusian border in allowing illegal cross-border flows. Smuggling and intellectual 
property rights violations, trafficking in humans, and the narcotics trade are endemic 
problems as Belarus acts as a corridor to Europe. The inability of Belarusian authorities 
to control their borders has profound implications across a spectrum of concerns. 
Smuggling and property rights violations undermine Belarus’ struggling economy and the 
tax systems of surrounding nations. Human trafficking, which most often entails forced 
labor, sexual slavery, or exploitation of young women and children, is one of the great 
tragedies of the 21st Century. It runs to the core of American moral legitimacy to make 
the eradication of this modern evil a national priority. Finally, the flow of drugs from 
Asia to Europe has a wide impact. Drug addiction has a deleterious societal effect in 
Europe and post-Soviet states. The drug trade is closely tied with organized crime and 
other economically destructive activities. Finally, it has security implications as money 
from cultivation in Afghanistan and Central Asia could be tied to terrorist groups in the 
area.  
Arms proliferation is another security threat to the United States which occurs 
through illegal cross-border flows. Illegal arms trade, though, differs from the previous 
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instances of trafficking in that it seems to be sanctioned by the Belarusian government. 
As will be further documented, sources indicate that Belarusian officials knowingly allow 
and often direct the sale of conventional armaments to rogue states and other 
internationally sanctioned groups.  
While the specific issues of political freedom, porous borders, and arms 
proliferation may be more important to the United States than Russia, the Russians are 
not entirely opposed, and in some cases may even share an interest, in seeing the 
achievement of U.S. interests. As will be shown in Chapter V, this mutuality of interest 
forms the basis of U.S.-Russian cooperation concerning Belarus.  
A.  HUMAN RIGHTS 
1. Democracy and Political Freedom 
The United State’ most visible and publicized complaint against Belarus is the 
lack of political freedom under the Lukashenka regime. In 2002, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Steven Pifer laid out a “step-by-step” approach by which Belarus could 
begin a rapprochement with the United States. While the United States obviously has 
other issues of concern with Belarus, the three most prominent ones Pifer chose to 
highlight were, “lifting the climate of repression, an end of the pressure on the 
independent media, and an end of the pressure on non-governmental organizations.”20 
Other prominent Washington policymakers have spoken out against the Lukashenka 
regime. Senator John McCain, after being denied a visa along with a delegation of other 
senators to visit Belarus, condemned Lukashenka’s totalitarian regime noting that his 
“government has routinely harassed, arrested, and attacked democracy advocates” and 
promised the Belarusian people that “such tyranny cannot forever endure.”21 In March 
2005, Senator McCain signaled his continued concern for democracy in Belarus by 
writing a letter to President Lukashenka requesting the release of jailed former 
 
20 Steven Pifer, fmr. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, “Transcript of 
DVC with Ambassador Steven Pifer: Minsk, Belarus,” 12 August 2002. http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives 
(22 Mar., 2005). 
21 Sen. John McCain, “STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN ON PRESIDENT 
LUKASHENKO’S DECISION TO BAR SENATORS FROM BELARUS,” News Center: Press Releases. 





                                                
ambassador Mikhail Marinich.22  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also recently 
condemned the Lukashenka government labeling it an “outpost of tyranny” and vowing 
that the U.S. “cannot rest until every person living in a ‘fear society’ has finally won their 
freedom.”23 Perhaps most indicative of the United States’ commitment to democratic 
change in Belarus is the 2004 Belarus Democracy Act passed by the United States 
Congress on October 20, 2004. President Bush in his statement regarding the bill 
commented that “Aleksandr (sic) Lukashenka and his government are turning Belarus 
into a regime of repression in the heart of Europe, its government isolated from its 
neighbors and its people isolated from each other.”24 President Bush makes it clear that 
democracy promotion is among the United State’s most important priorities in Belarus by 
his promise that the United States will “work with our allies and partners to assist those 
seeking to return Belarus to its rightful place among the Euro-Atlantic community of 
democracies. There is no place in a Europe whole and free for a regime of this kind.”25
It is plain that democratic reform is an interest for the United States in Belarus. 
What is more ambiguous is the form by which such democratic reform could take place. 
Theoretically, President Lukashenka could have a change of heart and initiate democratic 
reforms of his own accord. This however is unlikely, as he has given no previous 
indication of reversing his present tyrannical course. A more plausible scenario is one in 
which an alternative candidate, either from the democratic opposition or from within the 
Belarusian government, rises to challenge Lukashenka. Because regime change would 
make the achievement of democratic reform more likely, the United States can be seen as 




22Sen. John McCain, “LETTER TO  PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS:Calling For 
the Release Of Ambassador Mikhail Marinich.” News Center: Press Releases. 11 Mar. 2005. 
http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=NewsCenter.ViewPressRelease&Content_id=1540 (22 
Mar. 2005). 
23 Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, “Opening Remarks: Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee,” 15 Jan. 2005. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/40991.htm (22 Mar. 2005). 
24 George W. Bush, U.S. President, “Statement on Belarus Democracy Act 2004,” 20 Oct. 2004. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041020-14.html  (18 Sep. 2005). 
25 Ibid.  
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2. Cross-border Trafficking 
As the corridor of Europe, Belarus is a problem for Russia, Europe, and even the 
United States in its inability to control the flow of goods, people, and drugs across its 
borders. As a consequence of its officially open border with Russia and its de facto 
porous border with the Baltic states, Belarus is a hot zone for the movement of everything 
illegal between the East and West. Dmitri Trenin states that Belarus’ 350 km border with 
Latvia and Lithuania, known as the “Belarusian Gap”, is “considered to be responsible 
for some 40 percent of all reported cases of smuggling, including non-ferrous metals, 
petroleum products and timber from Russia, and tobacco and alcoholic products from the 
Baltic states, as well as westward bound illegal migrants.”25 While smuggling as a trade 
diverting activity represents an economic loss in taxable income for Russia and Europe, it 
is the illegal movement of persons through Belarus which more greatly concerns the 
United States.  
The illegal movement of persons, either through human trafficking or illegal 
migration, is a continued problem in Belarus. Belarus is repeatedly cited as “primarily a 
source country for women and children trafficked to Europe, North America, the Middle 
East, and Japan for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labor.”26 The 
International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) notes that in Europe, Belarus is among 
the major source countries for trafficking in women. The IFRC notes that Belarus’ 
existing response to the problem does not sufficiently address the situation.27 The 2005 
U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons Report labels Belarus a “Tier 2” country, a 
designation for those “countries whose governments do not fully comply with the Act’s 
minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into 
compliance with those standards.”28 That the U.S. Congress passed a law mandating the 
                                                 
25 Dmitri Trenin, “Moscow’s Relations with Belarus: An Ally without a Handle,” Chaillot Paper 78. 
(Moscow: Carnegie, 6 Aug 2005), 5. 
26  U.S. State Dept. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons 
Report. 2005 Accessed on-line at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2005/   (19 July 2005). 
27 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Human Trafficking in Belarus, 
Moldova, and Ukraine- Appeal 2005.” 
http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/annual05/logframes/Europe/05AA071backHumTraff.pdf  (19 July 2005).  
28 U.S. State Dept. “Country Narratives: Belarus Tier 2,” Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report. 2005  http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2005/   
(19 July 2005).  
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State Department to compile this data is indicative of the United State’s liberal 
conception of interest. This report suggests that such liberal interests are quite 
pronounced with regard to Belarus. 
To the credit of the Belarusian government, the Lukashenka regime is rhetorically 
cooperative with outside agencies in making the prevention of human-trafficking a 
priority. Its efforts remain superficial though, as inadequate funding for victim protection 
and poor law enforcement of Belarus’ borders with Russia and Ukraine continue to allow 
for the easy movement of people.29 On the issue of illegal migration in Belarus, the 
“Internal Affairs Ministry estimates that as many as 200,000 undocumented migrants 
pass through the country every year on their way to Lithuania and Poland in the hope of 
eventually reaching Western Europe.”30 The IFRC reports that this number is increasing, 
and is expected to only rise further with the recent accession of several of Belarus’ 
neighbors to the EU. This has profound implications for Belarus’ relationship with 
Poland and the Baltic States. As evidenced by the specter of the “Polish Plumber” in 
French media31, these new EU ascendants are already largely maligned throughout 
Europe as exporting cheap laborers who take European jobs and feed off of the wealthy 
European social states. The illegal flow from Belarus and points further east only serves 
to aggravate this perception. 
 Drug trafficking in Belarus is also worrisome for the United States as widespread 
corruption, porous borders, and a good railway and road system make Belarus an 
increasingly important transit country for narcotics.32 The U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency notes that, “Belarus is primarily a transit point for Afghan-produced heroin from 
Central Asia transiting Russia and Ukraine en route to Western Europe.”33 The transit of 
 
29 U.S. State Dept. “Country Narratives: Belarus Tier 2.” 
30 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Population Movement in 
Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine- Appeal 2005.” 
http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_appeals.pl?annual05/05AA07101.pdf  (19 July 2005). 
31 Martin Arnold, “Polish plumber symbolic of all French fear about constitution” Financial Times, 28 
May 2005, http://news.ft.com/cms/s/9d5d703a-cf14-11d9-8cb5-00000e2511c8.html  (19 July 2005). 
32 U.S. State Dept. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2005. March 2005. Accessed 
online at http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005  (March 22, 2005).  
33  U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, “Drug Intelligence Brief: Russian Organized Crime Groups,” 
January 2002, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02004/ (21 July 2005). 
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illegal drugs through Belarus is an area in which Russia shares concerns with the United 
States, but for different reasons. U.S. drug interdiction is motivated by liberal conceptions 
of interest. The Russian government has made drug interdiction a priority, though a 
peripheral one, as part of Putin’s larger effort to establish law and order as a prerequisite 
to rebuilding Russian society. Towards this end Russia and Belarus have been 
cooperating with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to implement a program 
to support the suppression of drug trafficking through capacity-building, training for law 
enforcement and technical assistance to law enforcement agencies fighting drug 
trafficking.34  
Porous borders are troubling for the United States because the same conditions 
that allow for drug trafficking in Belarus could also facilitate the movement of terrorists. 
As part of the larger war on terrorism, the United States desires to prevent the movement 
of extremist groups into Europe or Russia. Russian interests intersect here as well as 
concerns about the cross- border operations of Chechen fighters has made preventing 
terrorist movement a much greater priority for the Russian government. Toward this end 
Moscow has implemented several programs with Belarus under the auspices of the 
Russo-Belarus Union state and through regional security organizations to make it harder 
for Islamic radicals to cross the Belarusian border.  
While the Lukashenka regime has not accomplished much in solving the problem 
of Belarus’ porous border, it has at least recognized the importance of the problem as it 
impacts their relations with the West. Sergei Martynov, Belarusian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, makes this recognition clear, “Belarus has been a serious guarantor of regional 
stability in the fields that are of concern for the whole Europe. These are illegal 
migration, drug trafficking, trans-boundary criminality, human trafficking. And here we 
offer a real cooperation to the North-Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.”35 Arms 
trafficking, on the other hand is an area of concern for Europe and particularly the United 
States where Lukashenka has yet to get the message.  
 
34 UN Office of Drugs and Crime, “Russian Federation and Belarus Programme,” 2003 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/russian_federation_and_belarus_programme.pdf  (21 July 2005).   
35 Sergei Martynov, “Geographical Security Map: Interview with Sergey Martynov, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus,” Published in Sovetskaya Belorussia, 10 July  2004 
http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.php?d=publications/massmedia&id=3  (22 July 2005). 
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B.  SECURITY 
More troubling than the issue of border control, for which Belarus has the will, 
but not the capacity, is the deliberate sale of Belarusian arms to suspect regimes. On the 
issue of illegal arms transfers, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security John Bolton called Belarus, “one of the least responsive OSCE 
member states” and remarked that they “should not be in the business of selling arms to 
countries with histories of supporting terrorism or fomenting regional conflict.”36 Bolton 
also cited Belarus as one of the countries against which the United States imposed 
sanctions for “WMD related transfers to Iran.”37 The Belarusian Foreign Ministry claims 
that, “when supplying arms Belarus acts in strict compliance with the UN embargo, 
which bans exports of weapons and equipment to countries with unfavorable military and 
political situations or to countries participating in regional conflicts.”38 Yet, Andrei 
Sannikov, former Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus and now international coordinator 
of the Charter 97 human rights NGO, tells a different story. Sannikov contends that 
“Belarus has not only reportedly sold weapons to six of the seven countries on the State 
Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, but has also continued to defy 
Washington in doing so.”39 According to Jane’s Military Digest, between 1996-2000 
Belarus ranked 10th in the world in major arms exports and has subsequently carved out a 
market niche by selling arms to “rogue states”. It reports that Belarus has sold arms 
illegally to Peru during their border dispute with Ecuador and Tajikistan during their civil 
war, some of which were resold to warring clans in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. 
Lukashenka’s regime reportedly also sold T-55 tanks and Mi-24 Hind helicopters to 
Sudan, as well as other arms to Angola and Algeria. Jane’s also notes that according to 
 
36 John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, “Arming Rogue 
Regimes: The Role of the OSCE Participating States.” Hearing before the Commission for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. (June 05, 2003). http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives  (March 22, 2005). 
37 John Bolton, “Testimony before the House International Relations Committee,” 24June 2004. 
http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/archive/2004/Jun/  (March 22, 2005). 
38 Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “International Regimes Of Non-Prolife-Ration And The 
Export Control Policy Of The Republic Of Belarus,” 
http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.php?d=publications/massmedia&id=7  (22 July 2005).  
39 Andrei Sannikov and Mark Lenzi, “Belarus Terrorist Ties,” Washington Post. 12 June 2004. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35748-2004Jun11.html  (11 Aug. 2005) 
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U.S. and Israeli intelligence Belarus sold over $500 million worth of arms to Arab, 
Palestinian, and Albanian extremist groups in early 2001.40 
Perhaps most damning for Belarus’ relationship with the United States is the 
revelation of ties between Minsk and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Stephen Blank asserts that 
Belarusian-Iraqi trade turnover in 1999 was at least $60 million, with Minsk steadily 
trying to expand military collaboration as a way station for the transfer of Russian dual-
use technology and spare parts.41 In 2003, Ambassador Pifer reported that sufficient 
evidence existed to prove that Belarus had provided weapons and training to countries 
and groups that support terrorism including Iran and Iraq.42 This alleged cooperation with 
Baghdad seems to have entailed the sale of S-300 missiles and the training of up to 20 
Iraqi air defense officers in the Belarusian Military Academy.43 As late as 2004 Saddam’s 
regime seems to have been collaborating with elements within Belarus, as one high-
ranking aide to Saddam was reportedly captured with Belarusian passports for himself 
and other key figures, including Saddam’s sons. Sannikov comments that “Washington’s 
continuing concern about this matter is understandable, given that some of Hussein’s top 
officials and others in his regime may have escaped via Syria to the European pariah state 
of Belarus during or after the war.”44 As a conduit and source of weapons and support to 
America’s enemies, Belarus is a cause for concern among U.S. policymakers. 
As is clearly demonstrated the issue of arms is a significant stumbling block in the 
U.S.-Belarusian relationship. While other areas of cross-border flows, such as people, 
drugs, and smuggled goods, are of concern to the United States, these problems are not 
acute and are largely outside the control of the Belarusian government. Transferring arms 
to rogue states, though, directly affects the American realist interests of maintaining 
Eurasian stability and protecting the American homeland. Providing weapons to 
 
40 Jane’s Military Digest Online, “Belarus Defense Assessment,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 
20 May 2004.  www.janes.com
41 Stephen Blank, “Russia: Proliferation personified,” Asia Times, 2003.  
42 Associated Press wire dispatch, April 16, 2003 cited in Stephen Woehrel, Congressional Research 
Service “Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns,” CRS Report for Congress. 5 April 2005.  
43 Jane’s Military Digest Online, “Belarus Defense Assessment,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 
20 May 2004.  www.janes.com
44 Sannikov and Lenzi.  
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embargoed regimes is in direct contravention to international mandates and could 
undermine Amercan realist interest of maintaining and promoting a rule-of-law governed 
international system. By flagrantly violated international sanctions and arms embargoes 
Belarus is subverting the effectiveness of the international community and is directly 
contributing to the destabilization of and bloodshed in some of the world’s worst 
conflicts. Belarusian complicity in arming extremist groups also directly endangers the 
American people and increases their vulnerability to terrorist attacks.  
While events in Belarus impact both realist and liberal conceptions of interests, it 
is the liberal view which predominates in thinking on Belarus. Arms proliferation is 
certainly a realist concern, but the United States’ driving interest in Belarus is the liberal 
goal of promoting democracy.  
C. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN BELARUS 
Due to its gross human rights violations, its inability to control its borders, and its 
flagrant disregard for international arms regulations, the Lukashenka government in 
Belarus is a threat for the United States. While a change in leadership would not 
immediately strengthen Belarusian border control, it could dramatically affect the 
political climate within Belarus and its external dealings with rogue states and terrorist 
groups. Operating from the previously established premise that the U. S. would prefer a 
change in the ruling regime of Belarus, there are basically four options open to the United 
States. First, America could maintain its realist/defensive liberal response through the 
current “step-by-step” policy approach using diplomatic carrots and sticks to shape 
Belarusian behavior. A second option at the offensive liberal extreme could be direct 
military intervention for the purpose of regime change. A more muscular defensive 
liberal option would be the indirect subversion of the Lukashenka regime through NGOs 
and democracy promotion in order to bring about a Ukrainian style “color revolution”. A 
final option, which would fall under both the realist and soft liberal categories, would be 
to cooperate with Russia in choosing a compromise alternative to Lukashenka who is 
amenable to both sides.  
1. Maintaining the Status Quo  
Since 2002 the United States and Europe have employed a selective engagement 
strategy toward Belarus of rewarding positive steps toward democracy with incremental 
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rewards and punishing negative transgressions with sanctions and public condemnation. 
Unfortunately, this strategy has failed to bring about the desired change in Belarusian 
policy. According to the U.S. State Department, “Belarusian authorities have yet to take 
such steps to warrant a positive response.” This stagnation of relations led both the 
United States and the European Union to impose travel restrictions in 2004 on Belarusian 
officials implicated in politically motivated disappearances.45 Condemnation by the 
international community has only pushed the Lukashenka regime closer to Russia as its 
sole ally. The continuation of the current “step-by-step” policy seems likely to only 
exacerbate Belarus’ isolation and continued decline into authoritarianism and poverty. 
Sherman Garnett warns about the danger of allowing Belarus to continue to drift toward 
isolation and authoritarian rule. He writes that President Lukashenka “seems deserving of 
the cold shoulder for his contempt for Euro-Atlantic political and economic practices, but 
the Belarusian people are not…There are potentially serious internal consequences for 
Belarusian stability if they come to see themselves as permanently left out.”46  The 
recognition of this fact by U.S. policymakers is confirmed by the passage of the 
aforementioned Belarus Democracy Act of 2004. It seems to have become clear to the 
Bush administration that a more proactive approach is needed in pursuing American 
interests in Belarus. 
2. Military Intervention/Regime Change 
If the current U.S. policy toward Belarus is not aggressive enough, a second 
policy option is available to take the American approach in the opposite direction. This 
option of direct military intervention for the purpose of regime change has precedents in 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Yet, this seems 
a highly unlikely and probably disastrous course of action. From a merely domestic 
viewpoint, the American public is unlikely to support another expeditionary war, 
especially since any connection to the Global War on Terror would be tenuous at best. 
Military operations in Belarus would also be unsupportable logistically and from a 
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manpower standpoint, as American forces are already stretched in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The extension to another military front would likely necessitate the re-opening of 
conscription, the total mobilization of guard and reserve forces, or some other wildly 
unpopular personnel measure. Such a move would likely mean political suicide for the 
Bush administration and the Republican Party as a whole. 
A military solution would be equally untenable internationally. If the United 
States’ European allies were hesitant to follow the American lead into Iraq there seems 
little chance they would tolerate such a crusade on European soil. Even more frightening 
for the U.S. than a tirade by Jacques Chirac at the United Nations would be the possible 
response of Russia. The unauthorized invasion of Belarus by American forces would, at 
the least, sink relations with Russia to a low not seen since the Cold War. The Putin 
administration would likely come under great pressure to respond militarily as such an 
affront to Russian power and status would be viewed as unacceptable. Given the admitted 
disparity between U.S. military forces and Russian conventional military capability this 
could leave Putin in a situation where he may be forced to use nuclear weapons or suffer 
the political consequences. President Putin’s statement that “the nuclear deterrence forces 
are and will remain for a long time the main pillar of Russia’s national security,” 
combined with the thinly veiled threat to pursue all nuclear possibilities allowed under 
international treaties47 is a signal that the United States must take the Russian nuclear 
threat serious. As has been demonstrated, there is a preponderance of reasons, both 
domestic and international, which speak to the inconceivability of a military solution to 
the United States’ problems in Belarus. As in most national policy problems, the solution 
lies somewhere between doing nothing and doing too much.  
3. Indirect Subversion — “Color Revolution” 
The rumors and speculation swirling around Belarusian politics center on the 
anticipation of another “colored” democratic revolution. Variously named the “White 
Revolution”48 or “Blue Revolution”49 depending on one’s source, this idea has filled the 
 
47 Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, “The Concluding Address by Vladimir Putin, President 
of the Russian Federation,”, Priority Tasks of the Russian Federation , 16-17.  
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collective imagination with visions of mass protests, grand speeches by democratic 
politicians, and the birth of a free, Western-oriented Belarus. Such a scenario may not be 
as likely as either Western democracy proponents or Lukashenka regime elements seem 
to think as.there are a number of significant barriers to such a democratic revolution. 
 Several analyses of democratic revolution in post-communist countries cast doubt 
on the viability of a popular uprising in Belarus. Bruce Jackson offers one such analysis 
by looking at the Rose and Orange revolutions, in Georgia and Ukraine respectively. 
While the conditions he cites did not apply to the Eastern European countries of the early 
1990’s, they could offer some insights into the possibility for democratic revolution in the 
21st Century. Many of the elements of the Rose and Orange revolutions seem to be 
missing from the situation in Belarus. Bruce Jackson, the president of the Project on 
Transitional Democracies, has outlined six preconditions for democratic change in the 
former Soviet republics. The conditions include: 
1) An extensive civic society comprised of multiple NGO's where pluralism can 
develop; 
(2) Independent political parties which can contest elections; 
(3) An opposition bloc in Parliament which can offer alternative policies and 
serve as a training ground for future governance; 
(4) The beginnings of a business community which can financially support an 
opposition as a counterweight to the regime's use of government resources and 
corrupt business allies; 
(5)An independent media with the capability to distribute printed materials and 
with access to at least one independent television station; and  
(6) Civilian control of the military and security services adequate to ensure that 
armed force will not be used to suppress civil dissent.50
While these criteria are neither entirely necessary nor sufficient for a democratic 
revolution, their presence or absence could be reflective of the likelihood of a popular 
revolution’s success. This seems to bode ill for advocates of democratic revolution in 
Belarus; in many of the aforementioned areas, Belarus is lagging far behind Ukraine or 
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Georgia during the period of their revolutions. Even if one does not accept Jackson’s 
overly demanding criteria, other analysts suggest that revolution is not yet ripe in 
Belarus. 
a. Civil Society  
While there is an active and tenacious collection of NGOs within Belarus, 
this sector has been the focus of deliberate suppression by the Lukashenka regime. 
Freedom House’s 2005 report charges that, “the independent civic sector has been 
continuously squeezed out of existence by the authorities, with the closure of 56 high-
profile nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in 2003–2004 and the denial of 
registration to more than 90 percent of newly formed organizations during the same 
period.”51 Those NGOs which are left are often forced to operate out of neighboring 
countries such as Poland and the Baltic States. This suppression and exile has limited the 
effectiveness of democratic groups in mobilizing the Belarusian populace and can, in 
part, be blamed for the general malaise among the body politic in Belarus. 
b. Political Society-  
Independent political parties do exist in Belarus, but they are largely 
fragmented and disorganized. The indecision over the hoped-for uprising’s moniker is 
indicative of the general climate of disunity among the Belarusian opposition. The 
Belarusian opposition is split into two rival blocs, the Popular Coalition Five Plus and the 
European Coalition Free Belarus. The Five Plus coalition is made up of the United Civil 
Party (UCP), Party of the Belarusian Popular Front, the Hramada branch of the Social 
Democratic Party, the Party of Labor, and the Party of Communists, as well as scores of 
NGOs and smaller groups.52 This coalition, led by UCP chairman Anatoly Lebedko, is 
Western-leaning and has agreed on a general agenda of 1) fair wages, 2) economic 
growth and job creation, 3) rule of law, 4) government transparency, and 5) a sovereign 
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Belarus.53 The other coalition, the European Coalition Free Belarus, is led by Nikolai 
Statkevich, head of a wing of the Social Democratic Party. This group has trumpeted 
their desire to reform Belarus in the expectation of eventual EU accession.  
The problem with the Belarusian opposition is that although all the 
different groups share common values, they have had difficulty uniting behind one 
candidate. As David Marples notes, already four different candidates, Lebedko, 
Statkevich, Communist Party leader Sergei Kalyakin, and the exiled Zyanon Paznyak, 
have been nominated by their parties to run against Lukashenka in the 2006 election.54 
Besides these traditional party candidates, a number of possible presidential candidates 
have emerged who currently or recently served within the Lukashenka government. 
These names include Alexander Voitovich, a physicist and former chairman of the upper 
chamber of parliament, Valery Frolov, a general and leader of the Respublika faction in 
parliament, Valeri Leonov, the former agricultural minister. Other possible candidates 
include Alexander Yaroshuk, the president of the Belarusian Congress of Democratic 
Trade Unions and Andrei Klimov, a prominent businessman, former parliament deputy, 
and long-time Lukashenka critic. With all of these contenders for president, the 
Belarusian opposition must unite if they are to have any hope of defeating Lukashenka in 
the 2006 elections. According to a survey conducted by the Minsk-based Independent 
Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, all opposition candidates scored 
equally low with the general Belarusian public. Between 10% and 15% of respondents 
said they would vote for a given opposition candidate. By contrast, 37% of voters said 
they would vote for President Lukashenka.55 As is evident from the numbers, no one, the 
incumbent included, has the overwhelming support of the electorate.  
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  Even if the Belarusian opposition is able to unite it is not certain that they 
would be given a fair chance to compete in a election. Recent forced deregistration of 
political parties in Belarus’ regions are undermining the opposition efforts to compete. 
Human Rights Center Viasna chair, Alies Bialiatski, comments that this liquidation of the 
political parties’ structure is a direct effort to clear the political space for the 2006 
election.56   
c. Opposition Representation within the Legislature  
Things look equally grim for the Belarusian opposition if their presence 
within parliament is taken as an indication of success. The last freely elected parliament 
was the 13th Supreme Soviet assembled in 1996. This parliament was dismantled by 
Lukashenka and replaced with his own subservient replacements. Each subsequent 
parliamentary election has been marred by the suppression of opposition voices and 
outright fraud. Human Rights Watch notes that in the October 2004 election, condemned 
by the OSCE as “undermined by problems with the elections laws,” not a single 
representative from the opposition parties was elected to the 110 member House of 
Representatives.57 This is relevant in that most of the political figures within the 
Belarusian opposition have been out of the government for close to ten years.  
Additionally, by being forced to rely on Western support these politicians 
have become affiliated, at least in the Belarusian public’s mind, with the West. Such an 
association is not necessarily an asset in nation where 69% of the population views good 
relations with Russia as “very important” and only 22% “strongly favor” joining the 
European Union.58 Even if many in Belarus favor democracy and do not support 
Lukashenka, they also do not support completely realigning Belarusian society and 
foreign policy toward the West. According to Ira Strauss, “Democracy in Belarus can not 
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be built on an anti-Russian foundation.”59 Any rival to Lukashenka who truly represents 
the popular will must have strong ties to Russia. 
d. Independent Business Community 
The burgeoning business community within Belarus is beginning to get 
involved in politics, but is still a long way from significantly threatening the statist 
Lukashenka regime. The Heritage Foundation’s 2005 Index of Economic Freedom 
classifies Belarus as “mostly unfree” and notes that “roughly 80 percent of all industry 
remains in state hands.”60 The report also quotes the Economist Intelligence Unit in 
remarking that, “authorities discourage private enterprise through a combination of high 
taxes, excessive government regulations, and a deliberately anti-business climate.” There 
appears to be a marked lack of politically-minded oligarchs willing to spend their billions 
in opposing the regime. The majority of funding for opposition activities will likely need 
to come from foreign pockets. This too poses an obstacle. Contrary to statements from 
the Lukashenka regime, the West is not emptying its coffers to oust the current 
Belarusian government. Although the figure associated with the United States’ 2004 
Belarus Democracy Act was $40 million, that number was never firm and the only 
American money so far allocated to promote democracy in Belarus is the $5 million 
earmarked under the 2005 Freedom Support Act.61In fact, the USAID’s budget for 
Eurasian programs reveals that the actual funding does not seem to match the rhetoric for 
democracy promotion in Belarus. According to the USAID’s report funding for programs 
in Belarus is actually projected to drop during FY 2006.62 
Europe also is not putting forth as much cash as expected. According to 
RFE/RL, this is largely due to bureaucratic obstacles within the EU framework. 
Regulations on democracy promotion intended to promote aid transparency force donors 
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to work government-to-government and restrict what support can be given to individuals 
and private groups. All programs must be approved by the government in Minsk, which 
obviously hampers the likelihood of any aid reaching opposition groups. Until the 
European Union finds a solution to circumvent these regulations, the opposition in 
Belarus will continue to struggle to find funding.63
e. Independent Media 
The media community within Belarus is one of the least free in the former 
Soviet world. Human Rights Watch notes that, “All national television stations, and most 
radio stations, in Belarus are controlled by the state. Independent radio broadcasts are 
limited to non-political music and advertising. Citizens do not receive objective 
information from the state-controlled media.”64 Freedom House (FH) justifies its ranking 
of Belarus near the lowest level of democratic development in media freedom because, 
“independent journalists continued to be harassed with lawsuits, whereas deportation and 
detainment of foreign journalists are already customary.” FH also reports on the severe 
beating and even murder of journalists and reporters. The FH report does note however 
that “although the condition of independent media worsened substantially in 2004, a 
small network of printed press uncontrolled by the government continues to provide 
alternative information for a limited segment of Belarusian society.”65 The importance of 
media freedom to a democratic revolution can not be overstated. Eurasian scholar Charles 
Fairbanks in his examination of the Rose Revolution in Georgia notes that of the factors 
which catalyzed the uprising none was more important than a free media. The factors he 
cites include economic distress, an established Western orientation, direct U.S. influence, 
especially on the military, an aged authoritarian ruler with no obvious heir and a looming 
succession crisis, a divided ruling party, and an impressive array of independent 
businesses, NGOs, and media outlets. Fairbanks concludes, “Of all these, the nonstate 
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broadcast media may have held the key.”66 Given Belarus’ relative economic stability 
since 1991, its virulent anti-Westernism, and its relatively youthful, ambitious leader with 
a firm grip over his party, independent media sources become all the more important. 
This also makes Russian media outlets with established inroads into Belarus all the more 
relevant.  
f. Civilian Control of Military and Security Service 
Although there is civilian control over the military and security services, 
this civilian happens to President Lukashenka. With unchecked authority over these 
“power” services, it seems highly probable that Lukashenka would release his forces onto 
a general public uprising. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment notes that the Belarusian 
KGB is believed to be the least reformed of all post-Soviet intelligence services. This 
assessment observes that the KGB’s remit has recently been expanded to enable President 
Lukashenka to strengthen his personal grip over society. The 2005 Law on State Security 
Agencies requires the KGB to provide the President with real time data on key 
developments in all segments of Belarus economy and society as it is tasked with 
“furthering the nation's political and economic development”. Jane’s SSA notes that 
Lukashenka has also denounced the principle of public oversight over the security 
services, confirming that the intelligence community would only be accountable to the 
President. This lack of accountability has manifested itself in the willingness of 
Lukashenka's staff to use the KGB to crack down on opposition parties and human rights 
organizations. Reminiscent of Stalin’s purges the KGB has been implicated in several 
high-profile forced disappearances.67
Lukashenka has proven time and again that he is willing and able to crush 
dissent with force. International condemnation and sanctions have largely failed to cause 
Lukashenka to moderate his tactics. It may be that the Russians are the only external 
actor with any control over Lukashenka. Apart from the economic and political 
interdependence between Russia and Belarus, there is also considerable integration at the  
66 Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., “Georgia’s Rose Revolution,” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 15, Issue 2, 
(Apr. 2004). 
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military and security service levels. The Jane’s report reveals that Belarusian security 
services have close links to Russian domestic (FSB) and foreign (SVR) intelligence 
services and there is excellent "on the ground" co-operation between both analytical and 
operational sections of Belarusian and Russian intelligence agencies.68 This makes Russia 
an even more critical player in any revolutionary scenario as President Putin alone may 
have the power to persuade Lukashenka to restrain from political violence.  
4. Compromising with Russia  
If the precedents of previous democratic revolutions are any indication of the 
prospects for a future popular uprising in the former Soviet space, then democrats in 
Belarus have an arduous task in front of them. The deck is stacked against them in many 
vital areas and even Western support seems insufficient to propel democratic revolution 
over the walls of the last bastion of authoritarianism in Europe. Western funding could 
make up for the lack of a politically ambitious business class and a cadre of revolutionary 
experts exporting democracy from the states surrounding Belarus could pick up the slack 
caused by a dearth of domestic civil society. Yet, the United States and Europe are 
largely helpless to stop the Lukashenka regime’s internal machinery of repression and 
loosen its stranglehold over the media. Only Russia, with significant economic and 
political leverage, established media access, and connections within the security 
apparatus, holds the keys to regime change in Belarus. 
Other scholars also seem to suggest that this conclusion holds true. Henry Hale 
writes that Belarus is an example of a “patronal presidential” system which is 
characterized by two components: a directly elected president invested with great formal 
powers relative to the other organs of government and a high degree of presidential 
power based on patron-client relationships at the intersection of the state and economy.69 
He writes that Belarus differs from other post-communist states that have experienced 
regime change in that the institutional arrangements within Belarus allowed Lukashenka 
to ignore and extend constitutionally defined term limits. This made the option of 
defection very costly for elites within the regime and few have dared to challenge 
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Lukashenka. The implication this theory has for U.S. policy is that it seems to indicate 
that regime change in Belarus will not happen without a change to the elite incentive 
structure.  
As long as popular support for Lukashenka is lukewarm and the Belarusian 
president can count on the backing of Moscow, regime elites are likely to wait patiently 
as he contends with quixotic opposition candidates. The aforementioned variables of 
mass media, opposition organization, etc., largely determine the movement of popular 
support. Given its distinct disadvantage in many of these areas, it seems unlikely that the 
Belarusian opposition can mobilize the masses by themselves. Russian officials seem to 
be aware of this reality. Chairman of the Russian Federation Council’s Committee on 
International Affairs, Mikhail Margelov expressed doubts about the current environment 
for revolution in Belarus. Margelov stated to Interfax in April 2005 that, “[i]n order for a 
coup d’etat to occur, there needs to be predisposition of internal affairs of this or that 
country, for example a struggle between elites or clans for power.” Since in Belarus so 
far, “marches on the capital are not taking place, tents are not being put up in central 
streets, and security forces are not hiding in their barracks,” Margelov concludes that 
there is not much predisposition for revolution.70 If the conditions for revolution cannot 
be produced by the Belarusian opposition and Western ability to infiltrate Belarusian 
society is limited, the impetus for regime change would have to come from a foreign 
power with significant access to both the Belarusian public and elite structure.  
Conclusion 
This, then, leaves Russian support as the last possible avenue for turning the tide 
against Lukashenka. If the Kremlin made a definitive break with Lukashenka and 
supported another figure from within the Belarusian elite, this could signal to other elites 
that a genuine power struggle was at hand. Hale notes that “once elites form clear 
expectations as to who will win this struggle … elites again have incentives to steadily 
fall into line behind the new ‘patron’.”71 Without the support of a substantial number of 
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elites, especially in the security and media sectors, Lukashenka would no longer have the 
tools to manipulate popular opinion and maintain political supremacy. Additionally, a 
candidate with clear Russian support would likely gain large popular support as the 
majority of Belarusians, 69% according to Stephen White, favor close ties with their 
eastern neighbor.72 Russian political scientist Adranik Migranian emphasizes Russia’s 
vital position in determining the course of events in Belarus. Migranian reportedly 
admitted to Interfax that, “everything will depend on the position of Russia. 
Lukashenko’s dependence on Moscow is becoming maximal.” Additionally, Migranian 
called for the Kremlin to take a stand on the situation in Belarus, “[i]t is time for Russia 
to define its position, because the West has done so, Lukashenko has done so, and the 
opposition has done so.”73 Theoretically, at least, Russia seems to have the ability to 
significantly influence both elites and masses in Belarusian politics. As such, the United 
States will need to go through Moscow if they want to be a kingmaker in Minsk. The 
United States’ hope for regime change in Belarus lies in cooperation with Russia. The 
next two chapters will examine the factors driving Russia to meet the U.S. halfway.  
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IV. RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN BELARUS 
Serving as both its gateway and drawbridge to the West, Belarus is vitally 
important to Russia. This is especially so where Russia has a significant economic and 
geopolitical vested interest. Belarus serves as Russia’s conduit for energy transit to 
Europe and one of its most important trade partners. Belarus is also Russia’s closest ally 
in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the lynchpin to its reintegration of 
the former Soviet states. These aspects of the Russo-Belarusian relationship are important 
because they speak directly to Putin’s strategy for Russian great power status revival. In 
his 2004 state of the nation address Putin essentially develops two goals for Russia. He 
states that Russia’s goals are clear: “high living standards in the country, secure, free and 
comfortable; mature democracy and a developed civil society; consolidation of Russia's 
positions in the world and the main thing - a considerable growth in citizens' welfare.”74 
These goals translate into a two-part strategy: economic development and international 
peerage. Ted Hopf in a 2003 PONARS memo casts Russia’s actions in everything from 
oil production expansion to selling nuclear technology as “part of its broader strategy of 
restoring great power status through economic development.”75 Pavel Baev likewise 
asserts that recognition of Russia’s status as a “great power” is an important component 
of Putin’s grand strategy for Russia. He writes that the pragmatist Putin “is aware that 
sustained efforts have to be invested in upholding Russia’s ‘greatness,’ while pretending 
that it [Russian greatness] is a given may help to increase returns on these investments.”76 
Thus, Russia is pursuing the realist-informed end state of great power status through the 
dual tracks of economic development and integration into the international order. While 
these tracks are recommended as well by liberal thought, for Russia they are motivated 
by realist philosophy.  
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The conflict between Russian realism and American liberalism does not 
necessarily imply conflict between Russia and the United States. While Russia’s motives 
may diverge from the United States’, their goals of economic development and global 
integration fall in-line with American liberalism. Additionally, Russia very much needs 
the United States to achieve these goals. For the Russia, the long shadow of future 
interaction with the U.S. informs all of their decisions. Alexei Arbatov comments that 
“good relations with the West are a priority for Putin because they are an economic 
necessity…good relations with the United States are important to Putin because they lead 
to improved trade relations with Western Europe and Japan.”77 As the world’s 
hyperpower, the U.S. holds a key position in international diplomacy. Acceptance by the 
United States is necessary for Russia’s complete integration into the global economic, 
political, and military system.  
A. ECONOMIC 
1. Gas and Oil  
Russia and Belarus are intertwined economically in a number of areas including 
the military-industrial complex, general trade of commodities, and most importantly, the 
energy sector.   
Russia’s most vital interest regarding Belarus is in the area of natural gas and oil. 
First, energy exports are fundamentally important to the Russian economy. Russia is the 
world’s largest exporter of natural gas and second largest oil exporter at 10.7% of world 
production, larger than either Africa or Latin America.78 According to The Economist, 
mineral products make up over half of Russia’s exports at $57 billion, with a majority of 
that figure made up by oil and natural gas.79 Belarus is a primary recipient of those energy 
exports. Despite possessing 190 million tons of oil reserves, Belarus only produces 3 
million tons per year and is highly dependent on foreign oil from Russia and Kazakhstan. 
Although Belarus has three refineries with a total refining capacity of 40 million toe/year 
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(tonne oil equivalent/year), the country is still virtually enslaved to Russian energy 
exports. Even Belarus’ most successful refinery, the Mozir refinery, is partially owned by 
the Russian Oil and Gas Company “Slavneft.” In addition to Russian oil, Belarus is also 
heavily dependent on Russian gas, consuming 10.2 billion cubic meters per year. As the 
figure below shows, this makes up approximately a fifth of the 42.6 billion cubic meters 
the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom sold to all of the CIS and the Baltics. Although 
Belarus is important to Russia as a consumer of energy resources it is far more significant 
as a transit country. Europe is Russia’s largest consumer of energy exports and in order to 
reach Prague or Berlin the oil and gas must often go through Belarus first.  
 
 
Figure 1.   2004 Natural Gas Exports to the CIS and Baltic Countries (From 
"Gazprom in Questions and Answers," www.gazprom.com/documents/Voprosi-
i-otveti_ENG_FINAL-1.pdf   , p. 32 (15 July 2005)) 
 
Russian-Belarusian mutual interdependence is nowhere more clearly manifested 
than in the area of oil pipelines. Russia’s largest oil pipeline to Europe, the Druzhba 
pipeline, runs from oil fields in Russia and Kazakhstan to refineries in Belarus, as well as 
directly to Ukraine and Central Europe. The Druzhba pipeline is 1,470 km long with 10 
pumping stations inside Belarus. It has a capacity of 1.2 mil billion barrels per day and on 





                                                
Russian oil export. 80 The pipeline splits into two sections in Belarus with one branch 
running to Poland and Germany and the other section running to Ukraine, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary.81 Future development plans are making Belarus 
increasingly more important to Russia’s energy sector. The U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) reports that work has begun to expand the capacity of the Druzhba pipeline 
between Belarus and Poland, the area where it is most congested. The U.S. DOE. also 
discloses that a couple of expansion projects in Russia’s oil transportation network are in 
the offing. One project would extend the Druzhba pipeline into Germany. This would 
reduce tanker traffic in the Baltic Sea and allow for exports of Russian crude oil to the 
United States via Germany. The other proposal would connect the Adria pipeline with the 
Southern Druzhba (see Figure 2).82 These proposed changes are relevant to Belarus in that 
they would each increase Belarusian importance as the possessor of the northern portion 
of the pipeline. Russia’s reliance on the Druzhba pipeline to transport oil to Europe 
ensures Belarus’ significance in Moscow, because it directly impacts the vital Russian 
interest of regaining great power status. 
 
80 European Commission, INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe), “INOGATE 
Umbrella Agreement: Republic of Belarus,” http://www.inogate.org/html/countries/belarus.htm (March 22, 
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81 Energy Information Agency, U.S. Dept. of Energy, “Major Russian Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline 
Projects,” Russian Country Analysis, March 2005  http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia_pipelines.html 
(March 22, 2005).  
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 Figure 2.   EIA, U.S. Dept. of Energy, “Major Russian Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline 
Projects,” Russian Country Analysis, March 2005  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia_pipelines.html ( 22 March 2005) 
 
The only thing more important to Russia’s economic well-being than oil is natural gas. 
This makes Belarus – with an extensive gas transmission system of 6,744 km of 
pipelines, 6 compressor stations, 2 underground storage facilities, and 632 cathodic 
protection stations83 – a business partner whom Russia can not afford to lose. Russia’s 
most valued asset in Belarus is the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline (see Figure 3), owned by 
the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom. This pipeline has a capacity of 28 billion cubic 
meters which account for about 25% of Gazprom’s total gas exports to Western Europe. 
Gazprom on the whole provides about a 1/3 of the total natural gas import to Western 
Europe at 132.9 billion cubic meters.84 Gazprom’s foreign earnings from gas exports total 
$16.5 billion, making up nearly 16% of Russia’s export revenue and about 4.7% of the 
entire GDP of the Russian Federation. Needless to say, the oil and natural gas industry is 
vitally important to Russian interests. As a transit point for much of this export, Belarus 
is crucial to the maintenance of Russian energy revenues.  
                                                 
83 European Commission, INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe), “INOGATE 
Umbrella Agreement: Republic of Belarus,” http://www.inogate.org/html/countries/belarus.htm (March 22, 
2005) 




Figure 3.   Yamal-Europe Gas Pipeline, "Gazprom in Questions and Answers,"  
www.gazprom.com/documents/Voprosi-i-otveti_ENG_FINAL-1.pdf  , p. 33 (15 
July 2005) 
 
Given the uncertainty of future Russian-Ukrainian cooperation, gas pipelines in 
Belarus can only become strategically more important. Currently, 90% of all exported 
Russian natural gas passes through Ukraine,85 but that situation could change if relations 
between Moscow and Kiev turn sour. Rawi Abdelal notes that Ukrainian hesitance to 
allow greater Russian control of its gas pipelines has strengthened Belarus’ attractiveness. 
Abdelal notes that in 2000, Russia signed an agreement with the EU to increase natural 
gas exports to Europe, as well as, to create a new gas pipeline through Belarus, Poland, 
and Slovakia, effectively bypassing Ukraine.86  
This new pipeline, the Yamal-Europe II, would equal its predecessor’s capacity 
and reduce Ukraine’s control over Russia’s gas exports. U.S. DOE reports that as of 
March 2005, construction was pending as “Gazprom and Poland currently disagree on the 
exact route of the second branch as it travels through Poland. Gazprom is seeking a route  
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via southeastern Poland to Slovakia and on to Central Europe, while Poland wants the 
branch to travel through its own country and then on to Germany.” The figure below 
illustrates this proposed route. 
 
Figure 4.   Existing and Planned Natural Gas Pipelines to Europe. (From Energy 
Information Agency, U.S. Dept. of Energy, “Major Russian Oil and Natural Gas 
Pipeline Projects,” Russian Country Analysis, March 2005  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia_pipelines.html (22 March 2005.) 
 
However the details are worked out, the new pipeline will greatly increase 
Belarus’ importance to Russia and proportionately increase Lukashenka’s standing in 
Moscow. Both oil and gas pipelines in Belarus are of strategic significance to Russia 
because they are enabling Russia’s return to great power status. Pipelines not only 
generate the enormous amounts of cash keeping the Russian economy afloat while the 
country modernizes, but they also connect Russia to Europe, the heartland of world 
power. By meeting Europe’s energy needs, Russia is making itself indispensable to the 
Europeans and thereby increasing its standing in the world. 
The interdependence of Russia and Belarus on energy transportation is a mixed 
blessing for Russia. While it makes Minsk reliant on Moscow, it also gives the 
Belarusians leverage in the relationship. On several occasions, Lukashenka has shown 
that he is willing to use that leverage to frustrate the Kremlin’s plans. He feuded with 





                                                
domestic Russian prices. This was the condition –  along with allowing Belarusians to 
drill for natural gas in Russian territory –  that Lukashenka demanded and Putin granted 
in exchange for allowing Gazprom to buy Beltransgaz, which controls Belarus’s natural 
gas infrastructure, and create a joint-national enterprise.87 The IMF reports that 
“Lukashenko has since put up hurdles to divestiture of Beltransgaz, and Gazprom, in 
turn, has threatened to raise gas delivery prices substantially in 2004 (in which case 
Beltransgaz would raise transit fees paid by Gazprom).”88 As is becoming evident in 
Moscow, a more compliant regime in Minsk would certainly be in the interest of the 
Russian gas industry. 
Belarusian demands for subsidized gas are bad enough for Russia, but more often 
than not, Belarus is unable to pay even the subsidized price. Historically, when Belarus 
has been unable to make its payments, Russia has offered generous repayment conditions 
accepting industrial barter and even forgiving Belarusian debt. This was generally 
conditioned on Belarus’ acquiescence to Russia’s foreign policy demands. More recently, 
though, Moscow has taken a harder line. In response to Belarusian intransigence on 
foreign and domestic issues, Russia cut the Belarusian gas supply in February of 2004, 
until Lukashenka agreed to higher gas prices.89 In January 2005, Lukashenka vowed to 
“strengthen energy security and escape energy dependence on Russia.”90 That preventing 
further gas cutoffs is a priority for Lukashenka reflects the effectiveness of this Russian 
“stick”. Even if Lukashenka is able to carry through his ambitious program, Belarus is 
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90 “Lukashenko to Free Belarus from Russia’s Gas,” Kommersant Daily, 24 Jan. 2005, 
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2. Trade Relationship 
Another important factor in the dynamic between Russia and Belarus is their 
general trade relationship. Belarus was the second largest importer into Russia behind 
Germany at $4.9 billion in 2003. This made up nearly 48% of Belarus’ total export and 
accounted for about 13% of Belarus’ total GDP at market cost. Russian imports into 
Belarus during the same time period totaled $7.5 billion but only accounted for 7% of 
Russia’s total exports.91 This Belarusian dependence is highlighted in an IMF stress-test 
scenario that examined the impact of a hypothetical 30% decline in exports to Russia 
relative to a 2006 baseline projection. This test revealed that after Belarus’ foreign 
reserves were depleted, imports would adjust downward to absorb the remaining shortfall 
and thus stagnate in 2006, doubling the current account deficit to nearly 7 percent of 
GDP. Although lower output growth and real depreciation would help reduce the current 
account deficit in the medium term, the IMF report concludes that external financing 
would remain constrained, foreign reserves would remain low and the country could be 
left vulnerable to further shocks.92  From this it is evident that the Russo-Belarusian trade 
relationship is an unequal one with Belarus heavily reliant on its much larger neighbor.  
Additionally, Belarus, while an important trade partner, is not always a profitable 
one for Russia. Since some Russian products are subsidized to sell to Belarus, namely 
gas, the trade relationship is in some ways costly to Russia. It is certainly not as profitable 
to Russia as it could be if Belarus were to reform and modernize its structurally 
inefficient economy. In an effort to minimize the economic shock of post-Soviet 
liberalization, reform in Belarus has proceeded gradually and sometimes not at all. This 
strategy preserved Belarusian wages and employment levels during the 1990’s when 
most other post-Communist countries where experiencing hyperinflation and mass 
unemployment. Unfortunately, it has since left the Belarusian economy stalled in a 
Soviet-era stupor. Belarus’ geographic proximity, linguistic similarity, and cultural 
affinity with Russia make the two Slavic states natural trading partners. Without 
 
91 International Monetary Fund, “Republic of Belarus: Statistical Appendix,” IMF Country Report No, 
04/140 ( May 2004), 45 
92 International Monetary Fund, “Republic of Belarus: 2005 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; 
Staff Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the 
Executive Director for the Republic of Belarus” IMF Country Report No. 05/214, ( June 2005), 18. 
significant structural adjustment on Belarus’ part, though, this trading relationship will 
make less and less sense as Russia proceeds in its modernization. The figure below 
illustrates the disparity in the respective paces of Russian and Belarusian economic 
reform. 
 
Figure 5.   Figure 1- International Monetary Fund, “Republic of Belarus: 2004 Article 
IV Consultation—Staff Report” IMF Country Report No. 04/141 (May 2004) 10. 
 
Belarus’ economic status is important for Russia for two reasons. First, as a major 
trading partner Russia would benefit economically from increased Belarusian affluence. 
Rising incomes in Belarus would mean an expanded market for Russian goods there. 
Secondly, Russia is widely viewed as Belarus’ patron state, a view that will only grow 
more prevalent as integration between the two countries deepen. As previously 
mentioned one of Russia’s vital interest is peerage with the advanced industrial nations of 
the world. It is detrimental to Russia’s image as a great power if its client states are 
backward and impoverished. Part of Russia’s drive for great power status includes 
elevating its regional structures, the Eurasian Economic Union, the CSTO, etc., to parity 
with Western institutions. Russia can not achieve this goal if its closest partner is mired in 





                                                
Russia has at its disposal a number of tools with which to influence Belarusian 
policy. One method by which Russia could induce Belarus to reform would be to threaten 
to reduce trade with Belarus or increase tariffs on Belarusian goods. A more subtle 
method of stimulating Belarusian reform would be by increasing economic and political 
integration between the two countries. If Russia is able to establish a common “ruble 
zone” with Belarus then it will have gained an additional instrument of leverage in 
coercing Lukashenka to make the economic reforms that Russia prefers. For several years 
now, Russian and Belarusian authorities have gone back and forth over the introduction 
of the ruble into Belarus in order to create a common currency zone with Russia. Such a 
currency union is widely seen as the first step toward greater integration between the two 
countries on the way to a comprehensive Union-State. 
B. GEOSTRATEGIC- REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
One of the ways in which Belarus is most important to Russia is as a reliable ally 
and partner in building regional organizations. This has occurred at different paces for 
different sectors. Economic reintegration efforts between Russia and Belarus have 
progressed in fits and starts. More concrete success has been achieved in the security and 
military arena. Finally, real political integration, in the form of the Russia-Belarus Union 
State, seems to be the next step for this partnership. 
1.  Economic: EURASEC & “Ruble Zone” 
While Belarus has remained a strong trading partner with Russia since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the level of economic integration between the two countries 
has wavered. Rawi Abdelal writes that the Belarusian government never reoriented their 
economy away from Russia and toward the West because they interpreted economic 
dependence on Russia as mutually beneficial. This led to policies of closer cooperation 
with Russia and a stake in the multilateral reintegration of the post-Soviet economic 
area.93
Immediately after independence, the states of the former Soviet Union continued 
to trade using the ruble as a common currency. In December 1991, they formed the CIS 
 93 Rawi Abdelal, “Purpose and Privation: Nation and Economy in Post-Habsburg Eastern Europe and 
Post-Soviet Eurasia” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 16, No. 3, (2003), 923. 
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which was meant to foster economic integration as well as tighten political ties.94 This led 
in 1993 to the “Ruble Zone of a New Type” when Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed to unify their monetary systems with Russia’s. This 
common monetary zone failed, though, after Russian officials recognized the drain it 
imposed on their economy. Henry Hale writes that after the Soviet collapse, the ruble 
zone had become a hidden source of Russian subsidies to the other republics and that the 
“Ruble Zone of a New Type” was an effort to cut off these subsidies by forcing republics 
to put up collateral for cash supplies, which were treated as loans. Hale notes that even 
this “tightening of control could not guarantee that these republics would control their 
budget deficits, which would essentially amount to money created by Russia.” In the end, 
the 1993 ruble zone failed because of its danger to Russia as a source of subsidies and 
macroeconomic destabilization.95   
The failure of the “Ruble Zone of a New Type” was followed in 1995 by the tariff 
harmonization of Belarus and Kazakhstan with Russia in the CIS Customs Union. This 
economic integration occurred within the context of the CIS, but without the agreement 
of all the other CIS states, as many of these states had begun to take a divergent path 
from Moscow.96 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan later joined in 2001, with Ukraine and 
Moldova receiving observer status in 2002, when the Customs Union transformed into 
the Eurasian Economic Community, EurAsEc. This transformation was to entail a 
broadening of the scope of the organization’s work to include “the speedy forming of 
united economic space; the common market of goods, services, capital and labor; forming 
united transport, energy and information systems; co-ordination of external policy; the 
joint protection of external borders,” as well as a united position on entry into the World 
Trade Organization.97 Despite many conferences and agreements, this multilateral 
arrangement has yet to produce much actual integration.  
 94 Abdelal, “Purpose and Privation,” 898–933. 
95 Henry Hale, “Russia's Fiscal Veto on CIS Integration” PONARS Policy Memo 15. October 1997. 
96 Abdelal, “Purpose and Privation,” 918. 
97 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, “Cooperation within the Eurasian Economic 
Community,” http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.php?d=policy/multicoop&id=2  (5 Aug 2005).  
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The formation of a Single Economic Space (SES) between Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan is another avenue of multilateral integration. Originally signed 
in 2003 and entering into force in 2004, this agreement is meant to integrate the four most 
developed CIS states, who together account for about 90% of total CIS GDP.98 Claiming 
to be a “purely economic organization” the SES incorporates the custom territories of the 
four member states in an effort to allow the free movement of goods, services, capital, 
and labor as well as attempt to establish common foreign trade policy. The Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs envisions eventual harmonization on tax, monetary, and 
financial policies with an expected transition to a full economic union and the possibility 
of a common currency. The SES is to proceed in stages, requiring specific commitments 
to be met before integration can move to the next stage. Such a progression would start 
with a regime of free trade regarding the import of goods from other SES states along 
with the beginning of customs union prerequisites, the creation of a joint competitive 
environment, and the harmonization of national legislatures. This would be followed by a 
full free trade zone, then a customs union, and finally complete freedom of movement 
within the economic space.99 The future of this organization is uncertain especially 
considering the recent westward reorientation of Ukraine. 
Apart from multilateral integration, Russia and Belarus have attempted bilateral 
economic integration as well. This cooperation has come mostly in the form of a common 
currency zone and has often been tied to political agreements as well.  The renewed effort 
to institute a common currency began with the Russian-Belarusian Union Treaty of 1997. 
This initiative was repeatedly delayed due largely to Russian concerns over unwanted 
expenditure and surrendering control over the marketization process.100  Rawi Abdelal 
notes that the perpetually delayed monetary union was discussed and negotiated during 
the signing of political integration agreements between Belarus and Russia in 1996, 1997, 
1998, and 1999. Subsequent agreements have been equally futile in producing real 
results.  
 
98 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Russia- Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
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In 2003 an agreement was reached on converting Belarus to the Russian ruble 
during the first half of 2005, under which two Belarusian representatives would be 
appointed to the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) Board of Directors, and a short-term CBR 
loan of up to Rub 20 billion ($650 million) could be available to the National Bank of 
Belarus (NBB) to ensure stability in the payments system.101 Yet, even as they were 
concluding this agreement, officials in both countries were sending mixed signals about 
their intentions regarding the currency union which envisaged a peg of the Belarusian 
ruble to the Russian ruble in mid-2004 and “ruble-ization” from January 2005. The IMF 
notes that Lukashenko began repeatedly asserting that he would not give up the 
Belarusian ruble without additional Russian financial commitments and senior Russian 
officials began to suggest that the currency union be pushed back to 2006. It was during 
this time that the aforementioned 2004 gas dispute over the privatization of Beltransgaz 
began. Citing persistent payments arrears, Gazprom interrupted gas deliveries to Belarus 
during the harsh winter months of early 2004.102 Since this low-point in Russo-Belarusian 
dealings, economic relations have improved. An April 2005 presidential summit 
trumpeted the “dynamic development of economic cooperation” but failed to announce a 
timetable for the introduction of a single currency.103
With the January 2005 deadline for “ruble-ization” long past and agreement not 
yet met on a number of key issues, the most recently agreed January 2006 
implementation date is no longer feasible.104 The currency union, which has always been 
as much about politics as economics, may continue to be delayed as long as the political 
future of Russia and Belarus remains unresolved. Kaare Martinsen notes that a financial 
union with a common currency would mean an end to Lukashenka’s position as 
president. Citing Putin’s 2002 statement that the only possible way ahead for the Union 
was a complete merger, Martinsen concludes that complete Russian control of the 
Belarusian economy would effectively mean the end of separate political institutions and 
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104 IMF Country Report 2005,  12 
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the eventual abolishment of the Belarusian presidency.105 This is obviously not in 
Lukashenka’s interest and if Martinsen is right, it only stands to reason that Lukashenka 
would do whatever he could to stave off full integration while maintaining Russian gas 
and trade ties.  Dmitri Trenin predicts that if Russia does not do something to change the 
political status quo in Russia, “the union state will remain unfinished, a political 
dolgostroy [long-term construction project] that is virtually impossible to either complete 
or abandon. Which is exactly Lukashenka’s objective.”106
The idea of a common “ruble zone” with Belarus is controversial and its 
anticipated effect on the Russian economy is unclear. According to the European director 
of the IMF, John Odling-Smee, Russia has little to lose by pursuing the union and lots to 
gain. Odling-Smee writes that the union poses few significant risks to Russia as long as 
the union’s institutional arrangements do not infringe on the independence of the Central 
Bank of Russia.107 The positive side of such a union is that it could stimulate trade by 
reducing one more barrier to exchange. It would also induce the sluggish Belarusian 
government to implement needed structural reforms, improving the productivity of their 
trade relationship with Russia. Other economists have a less optimistic view for Russia. 
Höhmann and Meier assert that there are “high costs involved in any new integration of 
CIS states with Russia, especially economic and currency unions.” It was just such a cost 
evaluation which Höhmann and Meier suggest terminated the 1993 currency agreements 
between Belarus and Russia.108 The graph below illustrates the asymmetry between the 
Belarusian and Russian currencies and hints at the difficulties for Russia in absorbing 
Belarus’ inflated ruble.  
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Figure 6.   International Monetary Fund, “Republic of Belarus: 2004 Article IV 
Consultation—Staff Report” IMF Country Report No. 04/141 (May 2004), 13. 
 
Odling-Smee also cites several potential pitfalls for Belarus, because of the 
relatively small size of its economy. He notes that because of asymmetry in the 
economies of the two countries, economic shocks, such as sudden changes in oil prices or 
severe drought, could affect each country differently. Under the currency union, 
monetary policy would be outside the control of the National Bank of Belarus, which 
otherwise could manipulate the cash supply to absorb an asymmetric shock. Odling-Smee 
also warns that the Russian ruble could appreciate in real terms against other major 
currencies, increasing competitive pressure on Belarusian industry in a problem often 
known as “Dutch Disease”. Odling-Smee predicts that if Belarus does not carry out major 
structural reforms and apply sound fiscal policy, then the Belarus National Bank will 
eventually begin to lose reserves and could reach a point where the currency union would 
have to be dissolved.109 The IMF notes that in order for Belarus to derive net, long-term 
benefits from the union, officials must reach agreement with Russia on the appropriate 
level of the conversion exchange rate, the modalities of monetary policy decision making, 
the status of transfers prior to and following the adoption of the Russian ruble, and the 
                                                 





                                                
rules for fiscal prudence. Establishing these provisions, along with enduring structural 
reform in Belarus will be required for a lasting economically favorable currency union.110  
It then appears that the common “ruble zone” could be beneficial for both Russia 
and Belarus, but only if it is implemented properly. If Belarus carries out the economic 
reforms necessary to make a currency union work, then Russia will have an established 
market for trade with a greatly improved trading partner. This would reduce Belarus’ 
need for subsidized energy while concurrently deepening integration with Russia. For 
both Russia and Belarus the stakes will be raised once a currency union is implemented 
and success will be largely contingent on the ability of the Belarusian government to 
implement major reform.  
2.  Security: CSTO & Bi-Lateral Integration 
While economic integration between Belarus and Russia has produced a lot of 
smoke but little fire, cooperation in the area of defense and security has been more 
substantial. Defense integration has moved forward along two tracks: in multilateral 
institutions such as CIS/CSTO and through bilateral agreements exclusively between 
Russia and Belarus. Although multilateral integration has been generally less substantive 
than in bilateral agreements, Belarus still stands out as the most receptive of the former 
Soviet republics to Moscow’s pan-Eurasian initiatives.  Jane’s Sentinel Security 
Assessment notes that while most of the former Soviet states have largely ignored the CIS 
in their national defense policies, Belarus has been the lone exception.111 Hrihoriy 
Perepelitsa writes that “Belarus is the most active participant in implementing military-
technical programs and agreements under the Treaty, signing 91 percent of all 
agreements and treaties reviewed by the CIS Council of Defense Ministers.”112 One such 
agreement was on the Council on Collective Security (CCS), which later became the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This organization includes Kazakhstan, 
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Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, Belarus, and Armenia. Evolving out of the CIS 
framework in 1992, the CCS was a military coordination body, which was little used 
during the Yeltsin years, but gained new life with the ascension of Putin. In 2002, the 
CCS evolved into the CSTO in order “to ensure management of the Collective Quick-
Deployment Forces in Central Asia and forces on other collective security theaters, and to 
combat international terrorism, drug trafficking, etc.”113 This Russian led initiative has so 
far provided for coordination on air-defense across the CIS, an Anti-Terrorism Center in 
Tashkent, and a CIS Rapid Reaction Force. Dmitri Trenin writes that “since Belarus 
joined the Joint Air Defence System of the CIS states in 1995, its air defences have been 
de facto integrated in Russia’s.”114  Belarus has supported the CSTO, but because of the 
organization’s focus on Central Asia, Lukashenka has been hesitant to involve Belarus 
too heavily in that region’s problems.115 Security cooperation within the CIS framework 
has been limited on the whole and has not yielded the same collaboration as bilateral 
agreements. 
It is in bilateral relations with Russia that Belarus has seen the greatest military 
cooperation. Jane’s writes that Russia and Belarus have concluded a number of military 
agreements including a provision under the 1999 Russia-Belarus Union Treaty which 
“requires that the two states develop a joint defence policy and armed forces, and to co-
operate in the use of military infrastructure,” as well as four other defense co-operation 
agreements calling for “technical co-operation between 2001 and 2005, the unification of 
military law, co-operation in utilizing arms and ammunition, and the creation of a single 
technical maintenance service programme for joint forces.”116 Trenin reveals that this 
paper integration has become concrete with the incorporation of Belarus’ armed forces 
and Russia’s western military district into “a 300,000 strong joint command, to be 
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activated in case of crisis.”117 Despite this integrated command structure, Russia does not 
have combat troops stationed in Russia. What it does have is a pair of forward deployed 
communication facilities in Vileyka and Baranavichy, which were leased free of charge 
to Russia for 25 years in 1995.118 The installation in Vileyka is a low frequency 
submarine tracking station and communication center that allows Russia to communicate 
with its submarines and ships in the Atlantic. The second facility, in Baranavichy, is a 
Volga early-warning radar system under the command of Russian Space Troops which 
can track missiles and objects to the west and northwest of Russia in space 4,000 km 
away.119 The installation of this facility in 2002 gives testament to the fact that air defense 
is the fastest integrating sector of Russo-Belarusian military cooperation. 
 Russia and Belarus are intertwined not only with respect to their military forces, 
but in their military industrial complexes as well. Perepelitsa claims that military-
industrial cooperation between Russia and Belarus is the deepest and most advanced of 
any sector of the Union integration.120 In fact, this interdependence is a legacy of the 
Soviet defense production strategy which spread defense component manufactures across 
the various republics of the Soviet Union. As a result, Belarus became the major 
production center for military electronics, including the control systems for the S-300 
missile system and the Su-27 fighter jet.  Since the fall of the Soviet Union, this mutual 
dependence has deepened as Belarus, which accounted for only one to three percent of 
defense production in the Soviet Union, now makes up 15% of Russian defense 
procurement.121  Perepelitsa remarks that, “as a result of these roots of integrated Soviet 
defense production, Ukraine and Belarus find it virtually impossible to continue 
manufacturing defense equipment without close cooperation with the Russian military-
industrial complex.”122 Russia, understandably, has a significant interest in the Belarusian 
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defense industry not only because of the two countries’ close ties, but also because Minsk 
represents a competitor to Russia in the military production market. Martinsen remarks 
that production costs in Belarus are far lower than in Russia and this has “enabled 
Belarusian enterprises to export items identical to but cheaper than Russian products.”123  
This competitive pressure and synergistic production system has motivated 
Russian arms producers to attempt to consolidate integration with Belarusian defense 
industries, a strategy which Lukashenka has stalwartly resisted. This resistance on 
Lukashenka’s part does not seem to be in Belarus’ interest. Based merely on economic 
reasons Belarus should want to integrate with Russia in the defense production sector. 
Perepelitsa asserts that the “the framework of the Union agreement significantly 
improves the Belarusian defense industry’s access to Russian markets and additional 
financial resources.” Because this integration provides the best conditions for competition 
with Russian defense enterprises, he claims that the military-industrial establishment has 
been a driving force for Russian-Belarusian integration processes.124  
Yet, Lukashenka has continued to block attempts to integrate Russian and 
Belarusian defense industries. This, Martinsen alleges, is because Lukashenka has a 
personal interest in keeping arms production nationalized. Martinsen claims that 
“armaments exports have generated a steady source of income, not so much for the 
(defense) enterprises or the state budget as for the president. The so-called Presidential 
fund at Lukashenko’s disposal is, apparently, replenished with income from arms 
exports.” Martinsen reveals that the existence of this slush fund was only made public in 
2000 and there is still no visibility as to how much cash exists and how it is spent.120  If 
this is true, it certainly helps to explain why integration between Russian and Belarusian 
defense industries has not progressed as much as would otherwise be expected. It also 
provides one more reason why Lukashenka’s presence is a threat to Russian interests. 
The implications of Russo-Belarusian defense cooperation and military-industrial 
interdependence are unclear. Perepelitsa sees military-industrial cooperation as a means 
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for Russia to achieve its military-political interests and geopolitical ambitions. He asserts 
that the ultimate goal is to integrate Belarus and Ukraine into Russia’s defense and 
economic spheres and potentially incorporate them into a single Russian state. Perepelitsa 
claims that in Russia, military cooperation is seen “as an engine for such reintegration 
and Russification.” 125 John Erickson notes that in the rhetoric of Russian realists, Belarus 
plays a vital role in “extending Russia’s ‘defense space’”. He writes that in this context, 
“Russian military and security priorities are a highly significant ‘locomotive’ driving a 
specific form of integration, carving out defined geostrategic and geopolitical ‘space’”.122 
As in the economic sector, it seems only logical that increasing military integration would 
eventually bring political integration. Of all three sectors, it is in the political arena where 
integration between Russia and Belarus has been most contentious.  
3. Political: Russia-Belarus Union State  
The story of Belarus’ political integration with Russia is in some ways a tale of a 
nation’s search for identity. During Soviet times, Belarus was one of the most advanced 
and prosperous republics. It was also the most “Soviet,” having been the most affected by 
Communist social experiments. The disintegration of the Soviet Union left many 
Belarusians uncertain of their new national identity, while hyperinflation undermined 
their confidence in the turbulent free market. Ethnically related, historically linked, 
economically dependent, and militarily subordinated to Russia, it seemed only natural for 
Belarusians to orient themselves in the turmoil of the early 1990’s toward their Slavic 
brothers next door. By the 1993 presidential election, elites in Belarus had begun to see 
the value of an independent state and were moving politically away from reintegration 
with Russia. The Belarusian people, though, were not ready for such paradigm shift and 
surprisingly elected a previously unknown farm manager, Alexander Lukashenka, to the 
presidency. Campaigning on a platform of Soviet nostalgia and closer ties with Russia, 
Lukashenka played upon Belarusians’ fear of the chaos in other post-communist states  
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and their desire for a return to the normalcy of Soviet life. Shortly after gaining office, 
Lukashenka reinstated Russian as an official language and resurrected Soviet era flags 
and state symbols.126  
In the succeeding years, Lukashenka pursued ever closer cooperation and 
integration with Russia toward the end of a joint Russia-Belarus Union State. By 
proposing a political union with Russia, Dmitri Trenin writes, “Lukashenka brilliantly 
exploited both the post-imperial nostalgia of the elites and the natural desire of many 
ordinary citizens to come together again, reducing the barrier function of the borders that 
had not existed for 200 years and establishing closer links across the board.”127 
Lukashenka’s ambitions were much grander than a simple political union. With Russian 
president Boris Yeltsin increasingly incapacitated by sickness and alcoholism, 
Lukashenka was positioning himself to make a leap at the Kremlin.  
These ambitions precipitated his proposal of the Russia-Belarus Union State 
agreement in 1999. Martinsen notes that this agreement was the most popular and 
comprehensive integration agreement to date, receiving nearly unanimous approval in the 
Russian Duma and being the only one to specify institutional innovations to further the 
integration of the two countries. 128 The 1999 agreement provided for three governing 
bodies: the Parliamentary Assembly, a Supreme Council, and an Executive Committee, 
which Lukashenka undoubtedly hoped to lead. The appointment of Vladimir Putin, a 
dynamic former KGB agent, as Prime Minister, and then President, upset this plan and 
forced Lukashenka to change his policy stance away from comprehensive integration. 
Since then, Lukashenka has walked a thin line between maintaining close economic ties 
with Russia and preventing complete integration with Russia, which could doom him to 
political irrelevance. Trenin remarks that when Lukashenka’s imperial hopes faded, he 
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his own rule in Belarus and as a pretext for receiving Russian subsidies for the upkeep of 
his regime.”129 This dilemma helps to explain the often double-minded nature of 
Belarusian foreign policy.  
For Russia’s part, integration with Belarus could be driven by several 
motivations. The Union-State can be viewed in light of Russia’s economic modernization 
campaign as an effort to improve the efficiency of one its main trade partners. It could 
also be an attempt to secure its energy transit route to Europe. Some in Russia and the 
West see the Russia-Belarus Union State as the beginning of a new “gathering” of the 
“traditional Russian lands”. One such voice is Janusz Bugajski whose Cold Peace: 
Russia's New Imperialism… asserts that Russia is “still locked in its imperial ways, 
determined to restore its dominance over lost territory, penetrate and neutralize NATO's 
central European members, and regain by stealth some kind of competitive position with 
the United States.”130 Another  perspective equally informed by realism places Belarus as 
the last line of Russian defense against NATO encroachment. This is the view which 
Lukashenka has sought to perpetuate in order to increase his value to Moscow. Ira 
Strauss writes that “Lukashenko survived by playing NATO and Russia off against each 
other. He needed Russia-NATO competition for influence in Belarus.” Strauss claims 
,though, that this adversarial competition is fading away reducing Lukashenka’s leverage 
with Russia.131 Whether integration with Belarus is a new form of imperialism or the birth 
of a cooperative organization more akin to the European Union, what seems likely is that 
Belarus is a model for Russia’s future designs on the CIS. Russian deputy foreign 
minister Sergei Razov admits that “what constitutes longer-term goals with other 
integration partners has been put into practice or is being worked on in the Union 
State.”132 Yet, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov rejects that such integration implies 
Russian revanchism or a renewed Cold War. He rebuts that “it is high time to get rid of 
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the annoying habit of seeing every step taken by Russia with regard to the CIS countries 
as a sign of ‘imperial ambitions’…the logic of multilateral cooperation is more powerful 
than the logic of confrontation and alienation. That is why the future belongs to it.”133  
If Russia is pursuing integration with Belarus as a first step for further CIS 
integration, this template seems to be taking a decidedly Russian flavor. Putin seems to 
desire integration with Belarus, but entirely on his own terms. Lukashenka’s proposed 
union of equals is not acceptable to Moscow. Dmitri Trenin comments that Russia has 
every reason to work toward closer integration with Belarus, but no reason to follow the 
idea codified in the 1999 treaty, of a union of equals. He notes that “Russia dwarfs its 
neighbor by a factor of 15 in terms of population, 25 in terms of GDP and budget 
revenues, and 11 in terms of trade volume.”134 This dissatisfaction with Lukashenka’s 
terms could account for perturbations in Russian interest toward political integration with 
Belarus. Moscow will accept Belarusian overtures when Lukashenka meets Russian 
demands, but when the Belarusian president tries to maintain his personal power and 
force a union of equals, Putin pulls away. 
The prospects for future political integration between Russia and Belarus are so 
far unclear. The current path of “paper integration” with little actual results clearly does 
not serve Russian interests. What Russia wants most from Belarus is a profitable trading 
partner, a stable corridor for energy transport, and a loyal military ally. If it becomes clear 
that a comprehensive union-state is required to achieve these interests, then Russia will 
push political integration, with or without Lukashenka. 
C. RUSSIAN POLICY OPTIONS IN BELARUS: 
Dmitri Trenin in an August 2005 article outlines a number of possible scenarios in 
Belarus and the outcomes he expects from each. The scenarios Trenin suggests include 1) 
Inertia, 2) Revolutionary Change, 3) Preventive Change, and 4) Union.135 From these 
scenarios I have extrapolated a list of some of Russia’s policy options in the near future 
and their respective feasibility.   
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1. Inertia: Maintain Status Quo Support for Lukashenka 
One policy option Russia has in Belarus is to continue its current stance of 
lukewarm support for Lukashenka. The 2006 presidential election would be held as 
expected with significant tampering by authorities, suppression of the media, and 
harassment of opposition groups. Even with Western support, the democratic opposition 
would be fighting an uphill battle as the government would have free reign to quash 
popular protest with police forces. With Lukashenka unchecked, Belarus would continue 
to spiral into authoritarianism. With his power secure, Lukashenka could continue to 
impede integration and the Union-State would likely remain incomplete. Trenin writes 
that in such a scenario, “as discontent inside and pressure from the outside will grow, 
Lukashenko will become a liability for Russia.”136  
Such a policy would also hamper Russia’s relations with United States. This 
relationship is already strained because of worries about the direction of democracy in 
Russia itself and doubts about Russia’s contribution to the American war on terrorism.137 
If Russia is again perceived by the West as reacting against democracy, as it was during 
the Orange Revolution, then Moscow’s strategic partnership with Washington could be 
severely eroded.  
If Lukashenka is allowed to continue in his despotic direction unabated there 
could be dire consequences for peace and stability in the region. Revolution may 
eventually come to Belarus, though not one which Russia can control. Trenin writes that 
“the current Belarusian regime is moribund and is moving toward a crisis. The problem is 
not whether there will be a regime change, but what kind of regime change and when it 
will happen.”138 The fear for Trenin and others is that, eventually, the regime change that 
could result in Belarus would be much more violent and disruptive than in a mere “color 
revolution”. To prevent such a catastrophe, Russia cannot afford to chase events in 
Belarus; its policy must be proactive and forward-looking. 
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2. Revolutionary Change: Opposition Candidate in “Color Revolution”:  
If Russia decides not to support Lukashenka in 2006 a second policy option could 
be that the Kremlin publicly supports the opposition movement against Lukashenka. 
Pressure could be applied to Lukashenka to hold free and fair elections in 2006 and to 
submit to strict monitoring regimes. This option is risky for Russia as it is not clear who 
would emerge as the leading opposition candidate and what their platform would be.  
As chapter 3 showed, under the umbrella of the Belarusian opposition movement 
there are numerous individual parties of varying stances and strengths. The most 
important Belarusian opposition parties are those in Five Plus coalition. Of these, three 
parties stand out as leading the way in challenging Lukashenka’s authoritarian rule. 
These parties are the Belarusian Popular Front, the United Civil Party, and the Social 
Democratic Party. In order to achieve a full understanding of the opposition movement, 
an examination of these leading parties is in order.  
Party of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF)  
As the first opposition party in Belarus, the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) began 
as a reaction to the Kurapaty Massacre in which 30,000 Belarusian citizens were 
executed by the Soviet NKVD from 1937 to 1941.139 When the mass graves where 
discovered in 1989, and their existence subsequently denied by the conservative 
Belarusian authorities, the public’s specific anger at the Soviet past merged with their 
current frustrations with the Communist present. This popular feeling was manifested in 
the Martyrlog, an organization created by archeologist Zyanon Paznyak, the discoverer of 
the Kurapaty site,140 and soon took on a political character in the formation of the 
Belarusian Popular Front or Adradzhenie (Renewal).141  Adradzhenie focused on fostering 
Belarusian national identity and political freedom and brought together varied parties, 
groups, and notable figures such as Paznyak and poet Vasil Bykau, in advocating 
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Belarusian independence and democracy. It played a significant role in pushing for 
Belarus’s sovereignty and independence in 1990.142  
The BPF claims as its goals, “the development of Belarus as an independent, 
democratic, neutral state, which has good relations with all nations.”143 Of particular 
importance to Moscow is that the BPF opposes “special ties” with Russia and hopes to 
orient Belarus toward the Baltic States and Central Europe. The party promises cultural 
autonomy to ethnic minorities (Russians), but advocates the revival of the Belarusian 
language, which has long been denigrated to secondary status. Economically, the BPF 
advocates “fair privatization, liberalization of wages, anti-inflationary measures, and 
restructuring of industry and agriculture.”144 Regarding privatization, the BPF announced 
that it would not bar Russian oligarchs from participation, but would base its privatization 
program on the principles of 1) public transparency, 2) equal competition, and 3) 
complex solutions, meaning privatization who be conducted in conjunction with de-
monopolization, re-establishment of a healthy credit network, and reform of the tax 
system. 145 .  
Although in the early days of Belarusian independence, the BPF was synonymous 
with democratic opposition, it has since been eclipsed by other parties. Before 
Lukashenka’s rise to power, the BPF claimed the support of 1,000,000 people in the 1990 
parliamentary and 1994 presidential elections. Today, they claim to have 10,000 
members working in various capacities throughout Belarus.146 Having been the first pro-
democracy party in Belarus, the BPF has considerable name recognition. The 
combination of the BPF’s weak political position and western-oriented nationalism make 
this party an unpalatable choice for Russia. 
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United Civil Party 
The United Civil Party was founded in 1995 as a result of a merger of two similar 
parties, the United Democratic Party and the Civil Party. This unified party front 
competed in the 1995 parliamentary elections, winning 22 out of 198 seats in the 13th 
Supreme Soviet.147 Joining with its democratic allies to form the Civil Action bloc, UCP 
parliamentarians consistently opposed Lukashenka’s anti-democratic policies and fought 
against his dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in 1996. When the President disbanded the 
parliament and created his own hand picked legislature, Civil Action members refused to 
join. Since then the UCP has worked in cooperation with other democratic groups during 
the 2004 elections to lead numerous protests and demonstrations against the government. 
In the wake of the OSCE condemned 2004 election, the UCP with the other parties of the 
Five Plus coalition have launched a campaign to inform the public of what they deem are 
the actual results of the falsified election and referendum.148 This campaign targets the 
country’s provinces and should help boost UCP support outside of its urban base. 
The United Civil Party claims as its fundamental values “human rights and 
freedoms, democracy, supremacy of law, private property and free market economy.”149 It 
is a liberal party in the classic definition in that it values the individual above the state. 
The UCP claims to stand for self-government, municipal rather than Soviet 
administration, and reform of the military into a professional force. It holds as one of its 
chief reforms the need for freedom of expression and advocates competition against the 
state monopoly on the media.  
Economically, the UCP promotes a systemic market reform program of 
stabilization, liberalization, and institutional change toward the goal of a “free 
unhampered market.” It upholds the importance of all private property, including land, 
and the role of the entrepreneur as the engine of economic reform. The UCP avers the 
role of state as protector of the citizen as a consumer, producer, and taxpayer against 
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bureaucratic whims.150 The UCP’s advocacy of an unhampered market and strong 
Western orientation could make it a favorite of Washington and London, but does not 
necessarily sit well with Moscow. 
Ideologically, the UCP is slightly right of centre, based on their emphasis of 
Belarusian sovereignty, balanced with a strong market orientation and liberal democratic 
values. The party cooperates with foreign right-of-center political organizations, most 
notably the European Democratic Union, the International Republican Institute, the 
British Conservative Party, and the Russian Union of Right Forces.151  
The UCP claims a membership of only about 4,000 people and much of which 
comes from urban population and youth. Further reinforcing the notion that the UCP 
derives its support from the urban intelligentsia is the fact that 55% of the UCP’s 
members are university graduates.152 This is likely because their rapid reform program 
appeals little to rural farmers, who are favored by the agriculturally minded Lukashenka. 
 The UCP is notable because it has attracted many former government officials 
and noteworthy political figures. Victor Gonchar, a former Lukashenka ally, was head of 
the Central Election Commission chairmen until 1995, when he joined the UCP.153 
Stanislav Bogdankevich, formerly the head of the National Bank of Belarus, is a leading 
UCP member.154 Numerous other UCP members had served in the disbanded 13th 
Supreme Soviet. The fact that so many former government elites are participating in this 
opposition movement is important, because it increases the legitimacy of the movement 
and sets the UCP apart from more dissident parties, in that its members have proven 
experience in running a government.  
An important point in the UCP’s favor is the popularity of their chairman, 
Anatoly Lebedko. A lawyer and Francophone, Lebedko had been a prominent, young 
parliamentarian in both the 12th and 13th Soviets. Since their dissolution, Lebedko has 
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risen as a leading figure in the opposition movement.155 At 43, Lebedko has the youth and 
dynamism to mobilize an increasingly restive populace, as well as a reputation for 
competency and forward thinking from his time in the Soviet. If anyone is likely to 
become the “Belarusian Yushchenko”, it would be Lebedko.  
Considering its centrist platform and stable of well known political figures, the 
United Civil Party is one of more popular democratic parties in Belarus. Its chairman 
Anatoly Lebedko is one of the best known politicians in Belarus, behind Lukashenka. 
Nevertheless, because of the fractured nature of the Belarusian opposition, the UCP has 
yet to swing a majority or even a significant plurality to its favor. Like the BPF, the UCP 
has neither the political prowess nor the proper policy outlook to justify Russian support, 
especially when one considers the failure of its Russian allies in the Union of Right 
Forces to gain any seats in the 2003 Russian parliamentary elections. 
Belarus Social Democratic Union: (Hramada) 
The Belarus Social Democratic Union (or Assembly) is one of the oldest 
democratic parties in the opposition bloc. It was founded in March of 1991 and has been 
a player, albeit a secondary one, in Belarusian politics since that time. It held a faction of 
12 members in the 12th Supreme Soviet, elected in 1991. Its most notable member in that 
faction was Stanislav Shushkevich who, as Speaker of the Supreme Soviet, was 
“unquestionably the leading figure in Belarusian politics once he was appointed.”156 
Hramada supported Shushkevich’s bid for President in 1994, but, as mentioned early, 
was defeated unexpectedly by Lukashenka. In 1995, elections to the ill fated 13th 
Supreme Soviet were held, but the Social Democrats gained only a single seat, that being 
Shushkevich’s.157  This position was short-lived, though, as Shushkevich refused to 





155 United Civil Party, “About Us” www.ucpb.org/eng/ (29 August 2005). 
156 Marples, 61.  
157Ibid, 75.   
 69 
 
                                                
Lukashenka’s new hand picked parliament.158 Since then, the Social Democratic party 
has continued to oppose Lukashenka’s authoritarianism and has cooperated with other 
democratic parties in this effort.  
The Social Democratic Union is a centre left party which consider themselves part 
of the world social democratic movement. The Social Democrats differ from the BPF or 
the UCP on a number of key issues. While they all uphold democracy and want to 
remove Lukashenka from office, the Social Democrats do not advocate as much radical 
change as the other parties do. For instance, Hramada supports an independent Belarus, 
but is in favor of a continued role in the Commonwealth of Independent States. BPF and 
UCP, while not explicitly proclaiming it, seem more likely to want to direct Belarus 
westward, with a possible future in NATO. The Social Democrats want to keep intact 
Belarus’ traditional ties with Russia. While this ingratiates the Social Democrats with 
Russia, this party lacks the popular support to be a real contender.  
Another key difference is in economics. Having seen the havoc rapid privatization 
had on their former Soviet neighbors, the Social Democrats are in favor of more gradual 
privatization in order to lessen the inevitable shocks of capitalism. The Social Democrats 
advocate a market economy, but with a regulatory role for the state in education, health 
care, and the financial market. 159 This marks the Hramada’s greatest divergence from the 
center-right parties. The Social Democrats see a robust and active state as essential to 
good governance. This platform is more similar to German or French concepts of 
governance and is more akin to the Russian statist model than the route proposed by other 
parties. 
The Social Democrats have an important advantage over their rival democratic 
parties by advocating a less ambitious (and therefore more appealing to Russia) program 
of reform. This allows the Social Democratic Union to draw its support from workers, 
peasants, students, and military personnel, as well as urban and rural intelligentsia.160 
Thus the Social Democrats have a broader base, than the BPF or the UCP, whose support 
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is concentrated primarily in the cities. As the most nostalgic former Soviet state, many 
Belarusians are still leery of capitalism and the West, a fact the Social Democrats exploit. 
Their centre-left platform is comforting to many older and rural constituents, as it 
advocates a continued strong state role in the economy and the preservation of ties to 
Russia.  
Additionally, the Social Democrats have as their leader Stanislav Shushkevich, 
who as former Speaker of the parliament, was once the most powerful political figure in 
Belarus. For many older Belarusians he represents a link to the post-Soviet, pre-
Lukashenka era when there were realistic hopes for democracy in Belarus. Unfortunately, 
Shushkevich’s time may have passed. He is now in his 70’s and is unable to generate the 
kind of following he did in the early 1990’s. Additionally, some oppositionists blame 
Shushkevich for overlooking Lukashenka in the 1994 election, which created the mess 
Belarus is in today. The Social Democrats, as a whole, are having trouble convincing 
younger generations that their cautious approach is best. Belarus has been passed by in 
while the rest of Eastern Europe has westernized and profited. Belarusians seem to want 
to maintain their traditional ties with Russia while seeking the improved standard of 
living which the West offers.   
The rise of pro-independence opposition parties has been a factor, albeit a less 
important one, in preventing a Belarusian union with Russia. The democratic opposition 
has been a consistent critic not only of Lukashenka, but re-integration with Russia, as 
well. Since his election in 1994, President Alexander Lukashenka has systematically and 
unwaveringly set about reverting Belarus from its initial market democracy course back 
to a Soviet style dictatorship. Democratic and market development in Belarus has stalled 
and it is sliding ever backward into the failed forms of the past. At the same time, 
Lukashenka has made sporadic attempts to reunite Belarus with its former Soviet master, 
Russia. It is for this reason that most of the formal opposition groups in Belarus who are 
pro-democracy and pro-capitalism are also decidedly anti-Russian. Those political actors 
who uphold the value of liberal democracy and market capitalism see that Belarus must 
be sovereign and independent of Russia. The danger is very real that any opposition 
candidate might attempt to separate Belarus from Russia.  
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Russia is unlikely to support an opposition candidate for practical as well as 
ideological reasons. The opposition parties’ lack of standing with the electorate is 
certainly a deterrent for Russia. As mentioned previously, the opposition blocs are 
fragmented and no one party commands the support of the Belarusian populace. The anti-
Russian flavor of many opposition platforms does not sit well with the majority in 
Belarus. While many Belarusians might not prefer Lukashenka, the opposition has yet to 
present a viable alternative. The lack of consensus within the opposition makes it 
particularly difficult for Russia to step out and support a rival to Lukashenka. This is 
especially true early on in the process when Russian support would make the most 
difference for a candidate. Russia is only likely to support an opposition candidate if it 
appears he has a realistic chance of victory; otherwise Russia risks isolating the 
leadership of an important ally on a desperate gamble. Given the fractured and out-of-
touch nature of the Belarusian opposition parties, such a sweeping victory seems next to 
impossible. It seems unlikely that Russia would waste its time supporting an opposition 
candidate. 
3. Preventive Change: Compromise Candidate from Ruling Elite
One alternative that is not as impossible as the election of one of the traditional 
Belarusian opposition politicians is the rise of a moderate reformer from within the 
government.  This candidate could possibly arise from the pro-Lukashenka nomenklatura 
or from the moderate opposition within power. One such candidate is Aleksander 
Voitovich, a physicist who served as the President of the Belarusian Academy of 
Sciences and then chairman of the Council of the Republic, the upper chamber of 
parliament. As chairman of the Council of the Republic, Voitovich was designated as the 
legal “successor” to the president until 2003 when he was removed ostensibly on grounds 
of his age, 65. According to Belarusian political expert Vladimir Rovdo, “[t]he haste with 
which the speaker was removed shows that Lukashenka was concerned that he would 
become an independent political figure, as Voitovich had good relations with 
Moscow.”161 Voitovich is also amenable to Russia as he is purported to have made 
 
161Yury Potemkin Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Minsk, “Lukashenka Shuffle Met with 




                                                
statements condemning NATO actions in the Balkans as “militarist barbarism contrary to 
all civilizational values.”162 Although the source of this quote is questionable it gives the 
indication that Voitovich would not be as radically pro-Western as other opposition 
alternatives to Lukashenka. Other moderate oppositionists include General Valery 
Frolov, leader of the Respublika faction in the Belarusian parliament, and Valeri Leonov, 
Lukashenka’s former agricultural minister.163 The table below illustrates the expected 
acceptability of different opposition politicians among different political players. Of 
particular interest are the last two columns, which contain Russia and the West as 
political agents. Regarding the moderate oppositionists there seems to be a possibility for 
agreement between Russia and the West. According to Manaev, Voitovich is highly 
acceptable to both Russia and the West, with Frolov and Leonov presenting respectable 
options. These rankings seem to be justified, on the one hand, by the men’s previous 
positions in the Russian-oriented government and on the other hand, their current place as 
outspoken critics of the Lukashenka regime. Voitovich, Leonov, and Frolov also scored 
well among Belarus’ elite. Given the relative ambivalence of the electorate toward all the 
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Table 1- Prof. Oleg Manaev, IISEPS Director, “Matrix of acceptance" Independent 
Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, Minsk. www.iiseps.by (March 24, 
2005). 














А. Voitovich + ++ +++ +++ +++ I 
V. Frolov + + ++ ++ ++ II 
V. Leonov + + ++ ++ + III-IV 
А. Yaroshuk + + ++ ++ + III-IV 
S. Kalyakin + ++ + - ++ V 
А. Lebedko + ++ - - +++ VI 
А. Milinkevich + + 0 0 ++ VII 
V. Kolos + + 0 - - ++ VIII 
А. Klimov ++ + - - - - - + IX 
N. Statkevich + - - - - - - - + X 
Relative weighting of agents of influence in Belarus are given in brackets; Signs +++, 
++, +, 0, –, – –, – – – mean respectively: “to a great extent acceptable”, “rather 
acceptable”, “to a certain extent acceptable”, “fairly unacceptable” and “to a great 
extent unacceptable. 
 
Another consideration is the likelihood of the candidate to hamper Belarusian 
integration with Russia. A candidate who can credit Russia with his rise to power would 
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be significantly more cooperative in uniting Russia and Belarus into a Union State. An 
opposition candidate would also likely lack the ambition to oppose Russia’s choice for 
the presidency of the Russian-Belarusian Union. If Russia is serious about real and 
lasting integration with Belarus, it may have to co-opt Lukashenka and promote an 
candidate from within his regime. 
It is not unthinkable that Russia could support a moderate opposition candidate 
against Lukashenka. Trenin writes that “a preventative regime change is Moscow’s best 
chance of defusing a western-oriented revolution in Belarus.”164While a “color 
revolution” may not be as imminent as Trenin implies, the possibility still exists that 
Russia could fall behind events, as it did in Ukraine. Selecting an alternative to 
Lukashenka beforehand could preempt such an embarrassment. Taking a stand against 
Lukashenka could also co-opt Russia’s critics in the West who would otherwise accuse 
the Kremlin of promoting authoritarianism. A coup by the moderate elite could help 
appease Western fervor for democratic change without unsettlingly Belarus’ relationship 
with Russia. A moderate candidate might be more likely to undertake the economic 
reform needed to make a currency union function. He might also be more willing to 
follow Russia’s lead on integration and unification. If Lukashenka fails to bring Belarus 
in line with Putin’s timetable for the Russian- Belarusian Union State, it would not be 
surprising if Moscow backed another candidate for president. 
4. Union State Finalized 
A final option for Russia is to rush through the political completion of the Union 
State. There is some indication that a politically expedient merger is a possibility. The 
2004 “loss” of Ukraine by Moscow seems to have imbued the Union State project with a 
new sense of urgency. An April 2005 summit between Lukashenka and Putin, while 
failing to establish an official timetable for currency integration, produced an enlarged 
Union budget and significantly increased rhetoric on the importance of future integration. 
Pavel Borodin, the State Secretary of the Union State of Russia and Belarus claims that 
these meetings demonstrate the principals’ “overwhelming support for interstate  
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integration into a united country.” Borodin predicts that, “such issues as a united 
currency, Union’ property and united customs services are likely to be resolved before 
the year is out.”165 
This new haste toward a project which has lingered neglected for over six years, 
could be indicative of a number of possible scenarios. Increased pressure by Western and 
domestic groups may have revealed to Lukashenka his dependency on Russia, putting a 
stop to his usual waffling on substantive political integration. Sergei Markov, Director of 
the Institute for Political Studies, remarks that this interest in regime change may have 
had equally frightened Russia. He says that “now there is a threat of an anti-Russian 
regime coming to power in Belarus to involve the country into an anti-Russian coalition 
and block Russia.” Markov believes that this gives new impetus to integration efforts and 
the two countries will definitely become a unified state, “if Mr. Lukashenka’s dealings 
with Mr. Putin result in securing a place for the Belarusian elite in a new state.”166  
A new draft of the Union State Constitution which is being considered could hold 
a solution. RIA Novosti reports that this arrangement would create a single federal state 
with defense, trade, monetary, currency, tax, and other major policies vested under 
supranational institutions. Most intriguing is the seven year presidential term provided for 
in the draft constitution. RIA Novosti claims that Union State Secretary Pavel Borodin is 
advocating a Putin and Lukashenka president-vice president tandem. Such an outcome 
would allow Putin, whose term as Russian president expires in 2008, to remain in power. 
Mark Urnov, Chairman of the Ekspertiza Foundation, claims that the Union-State 
“loosens the soil for a new state system extending the terms of office of incumbent 
leaders. This is a 2008-oriented project.” Urnov cautions that in order to implement such 
a deal, Putin will need to make arrangements for Lukashenka who will lose his high 
profile in a combined state.167 Pavel Felgenhauer proposes a solution to this dilemma. 
Felgenhauer predicts that the Russian Constitution will be rewritten and the State Duma 
 
165Pavel Borodin, quoted in Walter Stankievich, “The Union State of Russia and Belarus: The Popular 
Will of Two Peoples, or a Creeping Annexation,” Belarusian Review Vol. 17 No. 2. 
www.belreview.cz/printable/articles/2912.html  (21 July 2005).    
166 Politichesky Zhurnal. “Russian Experts Believe in Merger with Belarus,” 23 May 2005. (from 
RIA Novosti’s digest of the Russian Press)  found on Johnson’s Russia List #21 (30 May 2005). 
167 Politichesky Zhurnal. 
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disbanded to create a new joint parliament, while the defense and foreign ministries are 
merged. He suggests that “Putin will be re-elected sometime in 2007 for seven years to be 
president of the new joint nation with Lukashenko as vice president…assured that the 
Kremlin will be his after Putin’s seven year term ends.”168 Although speculation about 
this possible conspiracy is largely unsubstantiated by official sources, it is not entirely 
irrational. Thus far in his presidency, Putin has placed greater priority on modernizing 
Russia and strengthening the state than on observing democratic niceties. If he interprets 
such a circumvention of term limits as the only way to prevent Russia from slipping back 
into the chaos and disorder of the 1990’s, then Putin is unlikely to hesitate to use 
extralegal means. 
Trenin discounts this option as a very bad scenario for both Belarus and Russia 
and “one that makes constitutional change of regime virtually impossible and various 
forms of political upheaval probable.” He comments that if Putin and Lukashenka 
became political bedfellows, despite their mutual dislike, they would become equally 
illegitimate in the eyes of many of their citizens and the world community. While Putin 
would receive the legal right to remain in office for another ten to twelve years his 
position would probably be fatally eroded. This would have a deleterious effect on 
Russia’s relations with the West and would undermine Putin’s efforts to be included in 
the club of civilized nations. Forcing the completion of the Union-State in order to 




Russia’s relationship with Belarus is a vital, if sometimes stormy, one. It seems 
that Russia views integration with Belarus to be of long term interest. Additionally, it 
seems clear that the United States and the West expect some democratic progress to occur 
in Belarus. If Lukashenka continues to impede both of these processes, Russia will not 
have sufficient cause to justify his continued presence. If Russia and Belarus make 
                                                 
168 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Vice President Lukashenko?” Moscow Times, 12 April 2005.  
169 Trenin, 6. 
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significant progress in creating a Union State, then Russia could continue to support 
Lukashenka through the election. If Lukashenka clings to his aspirations and continues to 
impede integration, then Russia may very well support another candidate against 
Lukashenka. It is doubtful that this candidate would come from the radical democratic 
opposition, but would more likely be a moderate reformer from within the government. 
What is clear is that Russia needs to take a definitive stance on Belarus and its eccentric 
ruler. As Trenin writes, “Moscow’s continued policy paralysis with regard to 
Lukashenka’s repressive regime is not in Russia’s best interest. Rather it is likely to 
collapse suddenly, ushering in a major crisis with international overtones.”170 The fact 
remains that Belarus’ future lies in Russia’s hands. If Russia’s future is to be among the 
great powers of the world, it must meet the expectations of the West.  
 



























                                                
V. CONCLUSION: CONVERGENCE ON COOPERATION 
As laid out in Chapter II, the theoretical basis for this paper is the neoliberal 
institutional framework for cooperation formulated by Axelrod and Keohane. The 
previous two chapters have shown what America’s and Russia’s interests are in Belarus. 
This chapter applies the elements of cooperation put forth in Axelrod and Keohane’s 
model. This begins first with an analysis of the mutuality in the interests previously 
detailed. Then this chapter shows how the other two aspects of this cooperative 
framework, multiple players and the long shadow of the future, are moving Russia and 
the United States toward cooperation.  
A. MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS 
1. Russia  
Russia does not oppose America’s interests in Belarus. Russia may not support its 
aims to the degree that the U.S. might prefer, but there is no clear reason why Russia 
should contradict them. Despite Western criticism of the consolidation of the power 
vertical by the Kremlin, Putin realizes that Russia’s future lies with democracy. The 
global integration track toward great power status dictates that Russia join the “civilized” 
nations of the world. A major qualification for this status is a consolidated democracy.  In 
his second state of the nation speech since re-election in 2004, Putin clearly stated that he 
“consider(s) the development of Russia as a free and democratic state to be our main 
political and ideological goal.”171 By the same logic, it would be detrimental to Russia’s 
acceptance in the West if Russia’s closest allies remain international pariahs. Robert 
Legvold writes that the current Russian administration has an interest in not only 
promoting economic reform in Belarus but also relaxing Lukashenka’s iron fist, “not 




171 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly” 25 April 2005. 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029_87086.shtml  (19 Sep. 2005).  
172 Robert Legvold, “The Economics of Ukrainian and Belarusian Security” Swords and Sustenance: 
The Economics of Security in Belarus and Ukraine. Ed. Robert Legvold and Celeste Wallander, 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 222. 
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Additionally, Lukashenka is no friend of Moscow, as has been shown. Rigid 
authoritarianism in Belarus is, at best, an annoyance Russia must endure and, at worst, a 
possible source of destabilization.  
Russia and the United States very clearly share an interest in sealing the porous 
Belarusian border. The unregulated nature of this entrance way to the West causes both 
economic and societal harm for Russia. Smuggling diverts from revenue-generating trade 
and the sexual trafficking of Russian women is a source of hurt and embarrassment for 
the Russian people.  
Finally, Russia does not have an interest in Belarusian arms dealing with rogue 
regimes. This is less ideological than practical. First of all, Belarus’ illegal trade with 
sanctioned countries creates competition for Russia’s own proliferation schemes. 
Additionally, by allowing Belarus to export these arms, many of which are Russian in the 
first place, Moscow loses a measure of control over their final destination. Part of Putin’s 
centralization of authority involves consolidating a hold on what Russian weapons go 
where. Belarus’ selling the fruits of Russo-Belarusian defense cooperation out the 
backdoor does not help this tightening of control. The prospect that these arms might 
eventually end up in the hands of Chechen fighters, as Russian weapons are apt to do, 
should be enough to motivate Russian support for America’s nonproliferation goals. 
2. United States 
While the United States may not have the same priorities in Belarus as Russia, it 
is not directly opposed to Russian interests there. For example, Russian energy resources 
are a vital part of European stability and economic growth. The United States has an 
interest in seeing an economically prosperous and stable Europe. To the degree that the 
maintenance of Russian transit systems through Belarus advances this purpose, it is in the 
United States’ interest.  
The United States also shares an interest with Russia in advancing the reform and 
privatization of the inefficient, Soviet-era economy in Belarus. This concern derives from 
the liberal national interest to see global free markets advance. This is beneficial for the 
United States because liberal theory holds, as more markets become open and free, the 
dynamic efficiency of global trade should increase as well. This in turn would raise the 
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general economic well-being of all nations. The institutionalization of a capitalist market 
economy would also be in the United States’ interest because it would help to spur 
political liberalization. Historically, as nations liberalized their economies and grew more 
affluent, they also tended toward democracy as well. While this is not always the case, 
the trend holds true often enough for economic liberalization in Belarus to remain in the 
United States’ national interest. 
Even in the area of integration and regional cooperation, the United States has no 
reason to directly oppose Russia’s efforts. It is only reasonable that Russia should seek 
integration with Belarus; they share a cultural affinity, historical tradition, and geographic 
proximity. The United States can realistically concede Belarus as a part of Russia’s 
sphere of influence. To the degree to which Russia progresses democratically and has a 
good relationship with the West, the United States can expect the same from Russia’s 
allies. To hope to snatch another state from the Russian grasp and orient it toward the 
West could be both foolhardy and dangerous. It could be foolhardy in that the majority of 
Belarusians, who are still largely eastward looking in their own perspective, would not 
support such a complete change of orientation. Ira Strauss writes that, “[t]he real choice is 
between a pro-Russian democracy in Belarus, which would be pro-Western if Russia and 
the West are friends, and a dictatorship in Belarus which is formally pro-Russian but 
actually plays Russia and the West off against each other.”173  It is dangerous in that it 
risks reinforcing the growing perception within Russia itself that the West is maliciously 
seeking to alienate and marginalize Russia. The United States dare not risk its much 
broader relationship with Russia in order to foist upon the Belarusian people a policy 
stance they do not want.. 
B. LONG SHADOW OF THE FUTURE 
Axelrod and Keohane theorize that the second element in cooperation is “the long 
shadow of the future”. This term refers to the expectation each side has of future 
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conditioning the possibility for cooperation between the United States and Russia. These 
two powers have a long history of interaction and each side is highly cognizant of the 
other in planning for the future.  
As the world’s lone superpower, it may seem that this factor operates less strongly 
for the United States than Russia. While Russia is in a relative position of weakness 
regarding the United States, Washington can hardly disregard the importance of its 
relationship with Moscow. James Goldgeier warns that “just because Russia is weak does 
not mean that it cannot hurt the United States. And just because Russia is weak does not 
mean that Russia cannot help the United States.” This, he says, is because many of the 
threats facing both the U.S. and Russia, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, and illegal drug trafficking, are best faced together, while Russia can 
certainly make these threats for worse for the United States.174 Andrew Kuchins, et al. lay 
out the issues driving the United States and Russia to cooperate. These authors assert that 
because of its geographical and strategic position America needs Russia to assure peace 
and security in its regions of concern: Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East. 
Given the rising status of possible peer competitors such as China and the European 
Union and the threat from anti-systemic forces (Islamist radicals, WMD armed rogue 
states, and anarchy in failing states), “America needs to reach out to friends old and new, 
including the regional principals.”175 Goldgeier echoes this sentiment as he writes “as is 
even more apparent after September 11th, Bush can neither ignore Russia nor afford 
conflict with Russia if he wants to redirect resources to deal with a terrorist threat and a 
rising China.”176 In addition to Russia’s geostrategic position, Kuchins and his colleagues 
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Russia’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its unique status as a nuclear power 
comparable to the U.S., and its world-leading reserve of hydrocarbons as reasons why 
Russia still matters to the United States.177  
The United States is also highly important to Russia in its pursuit of its national 
interests. Kuchins, et al. write that as Russia is confronted with rising threats in China and 
India in the east and a border of weak states in the south, “the U.S. will continue to be the 
most important for either the advancement or frustration of its geostrategic interests. The 
U.S. is the only power capable of producing tangible reactions to an array of challenges 
in different parts of the globe.”178  They remark that the keys for Russian entry into the 
club of great powers are sustained economic growth and effective resource mobilization 
to achieve national interests. Access to U.S. technology and economic resources are 
central to this effort. Additionally, U.S. diplomatic support would be crucial for Russian 
entry into the international groupings it has expressed interest in joining the WTO and 
maybe the OECD.179
It is clear that the United States- Russia relationship is an extremely valuable one. 
It certainly is not worth sacrificing in a confrontation over Belarus. The high stakes of 
their overall future interaction are a driving element in the possibility for cooperation 
between the United States and Russia in Belarus. 
C. MULTIPLE ACTORS  
The final aspect of cooperation in Axelrod and Keohane’s theoretical framework 
is the number of actors involved and the structure of their interaction. In their analysis, 
additional players tended to complicate the process of achieving cooperation by 
exacerbating the “sanctioning problem”, meaning the decreased ability to penalize a 
player for defection. As the number of players involved grows, the ability to achieve 
collective agreement to sanction a defector becomes more difficult. In regard to Belarus, 
though, the addition of another player, Europe, may facilitate cooperation by raising the 
stakes of defection by either side. 
 
177 Kuchins et al., 6. 
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1. Europe 
Relations with Europe are crucial for both the United States and Russia. 
Maintaining economic and diplomatic connections with Europe is vital to American 
interests. Likewise, Russian trade relations and great power aspirations largely depend on 
Europe. To the extent that Europe makes Belarus a priority, this mutual interdependence 
could compel both the U.S. and Russia to reach a compromise solution in Belarus.  
The extent to which Belarus is a priority in Europe is debatable. Some European 
states are adamant that Lukashenka needs to go, while others are less concerned. In 
particular, the newest EU entrants have taken the lead in promoting regime change in 
Belarus. Quite reasonably, the post-communist EU nations most closely located to 
Belarus, Poland and the Baltic States, have been more vocal in condemning the 
Belarusian dictator. The Polish foreign minister in November 2004 expressed his 
country’s concern in the following fashion:  
Poland will strive to maintain and develop contacts with representatives of 
civil society in Belarus, and to prevent its total isolation – which appears 
to be the goal of the authorities. At the same time, we shall avoid any 
gestures that could be interpreted as support for President Lukashenka and 
his attendants.180
The tension between Poland and Belarus has come to a head recently as Lukashenka 
expelled a third Polish diplomat from the country and raided the offices of the Union of 
Poles in Belarus, a democracy-promoting NGO. This has led the Polish foreign ministry 
to appeal to the European Union to “take decisive and co-ordinated steps and urge the 
Belarusian regime to respect human and national minority rights, international law and 
bilateral treaties.” France has already expressed solidarity with Poland and vowed to urge 
the European Union to take decisive steps toward Belarus.181  
 
180 Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz,  “Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Włodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz, on the occasion of assumption by Poland of the chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe.” Strasbourg, 10 November 2004  
http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php?page=1000000001&obj_display_cat=3&obj_display_full=896&obj_to_di
splay_type=29 (11 July  2005) 
181 BBC News World Edition, “Poland Seeks EU help on Belarus,” 30 July 2005 
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Other European states, though, are less immediately threatened by events in the 
former Soviet space and are more ambivalent toward the Lukashenka regime. These 
states are likely to tolerate Lukashenka as long as he continues to keep the gas flowing. 
Arkady Moshes concludes that “the EU is not so uncomfortable with Lukashenka” 
because Belarus is stable, relatively peaceful, has few ethnic problems, does not request 
aid, and smoothly transits energy from Russia. He writes that “in Europe there is no sense 
of urgency on the Belarussian dossier.”182  
The divide within European opinion concerning Belarus extends across the 
Atlantic as well. While Europeans and Americans feel mutual dislike for Lukashenka, 
they disagree on what to do about him. A report by the Atlantic Council of the United 
States echoes this sentiment in its assessment of the divergence in EU and US policies 
toward Russia. This report, compiled by a number of policy experts and scholars, notes 
that while the West is in agreement on the objectives of enhancing stability and 
promoting openness in Russia’s neighborhood, “where the EU and the United States 
differ is in the immediacy of this issue and their perspective on how it will affect their 
own interests.” U.S. interests, according to the report, are more global and strategic than 
those of Europe, as U.S. involvement in Russia’s neighborhood includes not just the 
central European states, but also the Central Asian republics.183 With this in mind, it 
seems that the United States has more at stake in this relationship than Europe.The U.S. 
has been more aggressive in condemning and pressuring the Lukashenka regime. This is 
due at least in part to ideology. Neoconservative elements in the Bush administration 
advocate the pursuit of democratic regime change through all available means. The 
European attitude toward democracy promotion tends to be more deliberate and patient. 
Andrei Zagorski writes that, unlike the United States, the EU is not seen by Moscow as 
having a desire to promote ‘regime change’ in their ‘shared neighborhood’ and appears 
 
182 Arkady Moshes, “Is Russia’s New Belarus Policy Emerging?” PONARS (Program on New 
Approaches to Russian Security) Policy Memo 355.  November 2004, 4. 
183 Atlantic Council of the United States, “Re-Engaging Russia: The Case for a Joint US-EU Effort,” 
Atlantic Council of the United States Policy Paper, Rapporteur Frances G. Burwell,  February 2005, 12. 
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unlikely to act as a revisionist force at Russia’s expense.184 Overall the European attitude 
towards Belarus is less tinged with Wilson idealism than the United States’. 
Russia and Europe, likewise, have differing views of the situation in Belarus. 
Andrei Zagorski writes about the divergent policies Moscow and Brussels have with 
regard to the countries in their ‘shared neighborhood’. Speaking specifically of Belarus, 
Zagorski writes that, “while both European states and Moscow dislike President 
Lukashenko, Moscow will not boycott his regime. Should the EU and Russia wish to pick 
a political alternative to Lukashenko, they would definitely look in opposite political 
camps.”185 Dov Lynch also indicates the possibility that Europe and Russia could butt 
heads in the former Soviet fringe. This could occur out of the simultaneous rise of Russia 
and the European Union and the growing importance of their shared neighborhood as an 
arena for competing interest. Lynch states that this situation leaves Europe with the 
challenge of promoting EU interests and values in its immediate border region with 
Russia, as well as creating the conditions for the greatest possible cooperation with 
Russia in the shared neighborhood sphere.186 Zagorski is ambivalent about the future of 
European-Russian interaction in Eastern Europe. He writes that “while the path of 
cooperation cannot be taken for granted the likelihood of conflict is strong in so far as the 
EU is beginning to consider seriously the European aspirations of some of these 
countries.”187
While Europe has a differing view on Belarus than Russia, and even the U.S., it 
will undoubtedly play an important role in the settlement of the political dilemma there. 
By sharing with the U.S. a desire for a political alternative to Lukashenka and sharing an 
interest with Russia in the stability of their eastern European corridor, Europe may be 
able to act as a moderating influence between the United States and Russia. It appears to 
be in both the United States’ and Russia’s interest to include the Europeans. The Atlantic 
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Council recommends that the US and EU “maintain a consistent common line in 
discussing the ‘shared neighborhoods’ with Russian officials”, as well as keeping the 
Russians informed of enhanced dialogues with neighborhood governments.188 Dmitri 
Trenin similarly suggests that “Moscow should initiate discussions on Belarus with the 
United States and the EU countries, such as Germany, but also Poland.”189 As an 
indispensable partner to both Russia and the U.S., European expectations will condition 
any cooperation between the two countries.   
D. POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION 
While the United States and Russia have different priorities in Belarus, these 
priorities do not necessarily entail conflicting interests. It is in Russia’s interest that 
Belarus has government that is stable and democratically–elected (and therefore less 
subject to revolutionary overthrow), secure borders and no military ties to rogue states. 
Likewise, the United States is not directly opposed to Belarus acting as a transit country 
for Russian energy products, being a productive trading partner, or even deepening 
integration with Russia. Any conflict would be over a matter of degree. Russia would not 
support radical democratic change in Belarus, if that change also brought about strategic 
reorientation away from Russia and toward the West. Neither would the United States 
favor Russo-Belarusian integration if the process was coerced or the resulting union-state 
authoritarian. Kuchins, et al. write that “Russia and the United States must be satisfied 
that the CIS states freely accept the other country’s role without coercion. Failing that, 
Russia and America can only agree to limit the scale and intensity of their 
disagreement.”190 Where there is a question of degrees, there is the possibility for 
compromise. Russia can concede that something must be done about Lukashenka and the 
United States can come to terms with the fact that whatever happens, Belarus will remain 
in Russia’s sphere of influence. Acknowledging these realities can create space for 
compromise. 
 
188 Atlantic Council, 12-13. 
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Where Russia and the United States most diverge is in their respective end-state 
preferences in Belarus. American and Russian end state preferences, implicit in the thesis 
thus far, are summarized in the following chart: 
 
U.S. End State Preference in Belarus Russian End State Preference in Belarus
1. Western, Liberal Market Democracy 1. Russo-Belarusian Union State 
2. Reforming, Russian-oriented Regime 2. Reforming, Russian-oriented Regime  
3. Russo-Belarusian Union State 3. Western, Liberal Market Democracy 
4. Isolated, Rogue State 4. Isolated, Rogue State 
5. Civil War- Failed State 5. Civil War- Failed State 
 
It was demonstrated in Chapter III that America’s preferred policy in Belarus, a 
democratic revolution, is unlikely without Russian collusion. In Chapter IV, I tried to 
show how such an outcome would be clearly against Russia’s interests. This makes a 
color revolution improbable. Likewise, the hasty integration of Belarus into Russia as a 
solution to Putin’s political dilemma is similarly unfeasible. This would do grievous 
damage to Russia’s relations with the West and give credence to fears of Russian neo-
imperialism. This leaves a reforming, but Russian-oriented Belarus as the most 
acceptable alternative to each side. Such an outcome could not be achieved with 
Lukashenka still in power. It seems then that the best policy for both the United States 
and Russia is a preventive, peaceful regime change which facilitates the rise of a 
moderate reformer from within the elite. Trenin writes that Russia “needs to make its 
preference known as to who is the best replacement of Lukashenka, from Russia's 
perspective, and support and protect that person.”191 The United States should follow the 
Russian lead in this process as a contradictory choice by the Americans could cause 
counterproductive conflict.  
Kuchins, et al. emphasizes the importance of the presidential relationship between 
Washington and Moscow. In achieving cooperation the dynamic between Bush and Putin 
will remain crucial. A recent summit between the two leaders reaffirmed the importance 
of this relationship to cooperation in Belarus. According to President Bush, the two 
                                                 
191 Trenin, 7. 
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leaders “discussed today the situation of the post-Soviet Union space. Our countries have 
joint interests in maintaining stability and economic prosperity of this vast territory. The 
position of Russia is well known. We come out for the consistent advancement of 
integrational process within the frameworks of this community of independent states, 
with respect to sovereignty of all our neighbors, their own right, without pressure from 
outside, to choose their mode of national development. 192
Kuchins, et al. also recommend a meeting of other important policy figures from 
the foreign and defense ministries.193 Through this working level summit, a moderate 
reformer could be agreed upon. Then the West could begin to generate international and 
Belarusian popular support for this figure, while Russia worked behind the scenes to 
engineer his ascendancy within the elite. 
Belarus is a problem for both the United States and Russia. U.S. interests there 
include the promotion of democracy, better regulation of Belarus’ borders, and arms 
proliferation. Russia is interested in Belarus as a transit country for energy resources, as a 
trading partner, and as its closest political and military ally within the CIS. The continued 
rule of President Alexander Lukashenka presents a threat to the interests of both 
countries. The United States would prefer that he were removed in an organic democratic 
revolution that instituted liberal norms and a Western orientation in Belarus. This does 
not seem possible without Russian assistance. Since Russia does not prefer this option, it 
is highly unlikely to collude with the United States in pursuing this outcome. Russia 
would seem to prefer that Belarus retains its traditional ties with the CIS and Russia, 
while a more moderate and reform-minded figure runs the country. This would not run 
counter to the United States’ interest and seems to be the best possible solution. Both the 
United States and Russia are constrained in pursuing their maximally preferable 
outcomes by the importance of their future relationship with each other and with the other 
stakeholder in this game, Europe.  
 
 
192George Bush. “President Welcomes Russian President Putin to the White House,” 16 Sep 2005 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050916-10.html (19 Sep 2005).  
193 Kuchins et al, 12. 
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1. Policy Recommendation 
United States should seek Russia’s assistance in promoting a moderate pro-
Russian reformer from within the Belarusian elite. This can be done bilaterally or in 
conjunction with key European partners. Alexander Voitovich appears to be one of the 
strongest such candidates.  If Russia, the U.S., and Europe were to stand as a united front 
against Lukashenka and support a moderate reform candidate, all sides’ interests would 
be served. Identifying the right candidate will require further research on the Belarusian 
elite. Opposition figures in Belarus are generally well-known, but there is a dearth of 
open source, English language information on elite figures within the Lukashenka 
government. Better understanding of the elite structure is necessary for United States 
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